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#### Neoliberal engagement with Latin America causes environmental collapse, poverty, and inequality – moral obligation to prioritize the impacts of Western hypocrisy

**Makwana 6** (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>, ZBurdette)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization

The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the few, writes Rajesh Makwana.

The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources.

There has been much international attention recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries.

The neoliberal experiment has failed to combat extreme poverty, has exacerbated global inequality, and is hampering international aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries.

Introduction

After the Second World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe. Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.

Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy.

The policies were most ardently enforced in the US and Europe in the1980s during the Regan–Thatcher–Kohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives.

There is a consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.

There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere 0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy. (Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.)

Neoliberalism has also been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including China).

The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world.

The dramatic economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger to ‘freedom and the American way of life’, Cuba has been subject to intense US political, economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at Venezuela’s president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to ‘economic nationalism’ is consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past 150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USA’s main economic objective.

According to Maria Páez Victor:

“Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the region’s most vicious dictators such as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet.”

As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model.

So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered a Global Compact with the United Nations, the world’s foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy.

However, there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically dominant countries are ‘kicking away the ladder’ to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs.

The US and EU also provide huge subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most ‘capitalist’ countries have increased their levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has increased. The requirement is to ‘do as I say, not as I do’.

Given the tiny proportion of individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the economy and what serves the public good is growing fast. Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs.

Below we examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.

Economic Growth

Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty.

Logically, however, a model for continual financial growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each second by profit hungry corporations.

Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty, representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed.

The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are both likely causes.

Free Trade

Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development.

With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services, increased inequality and caused environmental destruction.

In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers to the tune of £30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be.

The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a government’s sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework.

These examples represent modern free trade which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of national and global governance to further the free trade agenda.

Liberalization

The World Bank, IMF and WTO have been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies.

According to neoliberal ideology, in order for international trade to be ‘free’ all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.

Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US heavily protect their own markets.

A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporation’s intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in international markets.

#### Vote negative to interrogate the assumptions of the 1AC to create space for alternatives to neoliberal engagement

**Munck**, professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion, **3** (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, <http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf>, ZBurdette)

Taking as its point of departure the position that there are or must be alternatives to neoliberalism, this article explores the issue in relation to some examples from Latin America. The 2001–02 virtual collapse of the economy of Argentina and the recent victory of Workers Party candidate, Lula, in Brazil highlight, in very different ways, the need for a viable alternative democratic economic strategy for Latin America. Many progressive analysts seem to be paralysed by a false ‘necessitarianism’ which grants more coherence an d solidity to the neoliberal project than it merits. Argentina puts paid to that illusion. Will the exciting experience of Porto Alegre’s ‘participatory budget’ in Brazil now be scaled up to the national level or does ‘globalisation’ block this option? Do the old questions of imperialism and dependency now come to the fore again after being left dormant under the spell of globalisation? We may not have all the answers yet but Latin America is back in the foreground of thinking and practice around alternative economic theories.

There is no alternative (TINA) was an oft-repeated expression of Margaret Thatcher’s, used to dismiss any plausible alternatives to her brand of hard-nosed neoliberalism. One imagines that her friend General Pinochet, with whom she shared tea during his enforced stay in London, would agree with her. What is more surprising is the influence the TINA philosophy has had on social science analysis of neoliberalism in Latin America since Pinochet. What I propose is a radically anti-necessitarian approach to neoliberalism, inspired by the work of Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Things are not always how they are because they have to be so. There is life beyond neoliberalism. There are alternatives taking shape all the time at all levels of society in Latin America. The so-called Washington Consensus is no longer so consensual even in Washington and there is growing recognition that globalisation requires global governance. We therefore need to return to the rise of neoliberalism and globalisation in a nonnecessitarian spirit and examine the whole horizon of possibilities that is now opening up in Latin America as elsewhere. If the virtual collapse of Argentina in 2001–02 shows that ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism simply does not work even on its own terms, the exciting but also challenging prospects now opening up in Brazil under Lula underline the urgency of developing a credible and viable alternative to its policies.

### 3

#### They engage with a *grave* and *persistent* human rights violator - Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?

We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.

Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.

An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?

First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)

Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."

Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing.

We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 4

#### Debt will pass, but the plan destroys Obama’s finite leverage with House Republicans

Moore, 9/10 --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor

(Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)>)

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.

There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.

It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.

There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

#### Plan causes controversy and backlash – executive agreements and riders

Lugar et. al. 12 (Richard J., former US Senator, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, One Hundred and Twelfth Congress, Second Session, December 21, 2012, “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT,” <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>, alp)

An executive agreement would not require the two-thirds vote necessitated by a treaty, but instead it would be approved in the same form as a statute, requiring passage by majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Legislation approving the agreement, necessary implementing authorities, and clarifications regarding certain provisions of the TBA could be subject to amendment, including by items unrelated to the TBA itself, thus possibly miring the TBA in other political fights.

#### Failure to resolve debt ensures nuclear war and turns all impacts

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth. Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too. Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard.

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited.

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses.

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely.

When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 5

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Hydrocarbons are key – China’s on the hunt

**Fergusson 12** (Robbie, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

China’s thirst for resources

With the fastest growing large economy in the world, China’s hunger for resources is extraordinary, its “oil demand increased by more than 55 percent between 2000 and 2006.”[15] Despite possessing great oil reserves of its own, for the first time ever, China “became a net importer of oil in 1993 – and its energy demands are expected to continue increasing at an annual rate of 4–5 percent through at least 2015, compared to an annual rate of about 1 percent in industrialized countries.”[16] Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington Cynthia Watson notes that “China has a targeted need to find energy resources,” [17] because the subsequent shortfall in demand versus consumption has to be made up by the acquisition of resources from external sources. For the most part, much of this shortfall has been made up by importing from Russia, and importing from OPEC allies such as Oman.

However, as in any business, diversification is key to protect yourself from the turbulence of the open market and “volatility in the Middle East combined with growing uncertainty in oil-rich neighbouring countries such as Russia have led China to seek investment opportunities in other regions, particularly Africa and Latin America.” [18] While it would be a caricature to describe China as insular, particularly since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, it would be fair to summarise that its forays into Africa and the Americas represent its first real extra-regional political excursions. As its thirst for resources is not going to be quenched in the near future, “China can be expected to continue its determined quest for hydrocarbons and … will be venturing into the United States’ traditional zones of influence.” [19] This is the crucial point of discussion from the point of viewpoint of this essay. While China has made many more seemingly significant steps in its relationship with Africa, for the most part, the countries with whom it deals are not U.S allies. The table below shows where China imports its oil from.

#### Chinese influence is key to Chinese growth

Armony 12(Ariel Armony is Weeks Professor in Latin American Studies, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at the University of Miami. Spring 2012 “What Is China to Latin America”, http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/hemisphere\_vol\_21.pdf nkj) Note—Please excuse the capitalization issues—the article wouldn’t copy right

What is China to Latin America? Among other things, China represents a market, a partner and a competitor. China’s need for primary commodities to feed its manufacturing growth and unprecedented urbanization entails a vast demand for everything from soybeans to copper as well as higher prices for such commodities in the international market. Latin American exports to China have skyrocketed in response to this demand in the last decade. High commodity prices and ample revenues are helping to sustain economic growth and strengthen fiscal accounts in several countries. As mentioned above, however, Chinese demand mainly benefits commodity producers in South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. The smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean cannot benefit from trade with China unless they find a niche market (such as Costa Rican coffee). The reliance on primary commodities also entails the risk of resource dependency for exporting nations. This pattern of trade has clear limitations for long-term development. Among other limitations, it is not a big job creator and it does not contribute by itself (that is, without state intervention) to alleviate poverty and inequality. In brief, China is a market for Latin America, and one with great potential, but a shift from “fairy tale” to realism will have to occur if the region wants sustained benefits in the long run. Is China a partner for Latin America? China has the potential to collaborate with Latin American countries in a number of ways: in the realms of technology, infrastructure, poverty reduction and educational programs; as a source of foreign investment and aid; and as an ally on the diplomatic front. as Juan Gabriel tokatlian has argued, for example, China’s model of international diplomacy entails some attractive notions for Latin America: multilateral politics, noninterference in domestic affairs, sovereign integrity, horizontal collaboration between “equals” and pragmatism. a concrete potential for partnership exists in this realm. China conceives of its national security as a three-pronged approach: “national sovereignty” (territorial integrity and national reunification), “comprehensive security” (preservation of its political and economic system and cultural heritage), and “security in the global system” (terms of insertion in the international system). to guarantee terms of insertion that could satisfy the Chinese leadership’s demand for “equality, fairness, and justice,”

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 6

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics—displaces voluntary efforts

**Younkins 2k** (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm, JMP)

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion.

If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should:

before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it;

ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...;

recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and

begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes.

Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

### 1NC – Relations

#### Economic ties are high and resilient

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The economic ties between the United States and Mexico are reinforced by a large web of social networks. Thirty-two million U.S. residents, or one in ten, are of Mexican origin, including roughly 12 million people born in Mexico.10 Perhaps a million Americans live in Mexico, almost a fifth of all Americans who live abroad.11 Close to 15,000 Mexicans are pursuing college degrees in the United States, and 13 million Mexicans visit the U.S. in 2010.12 As the top tourist destination for U.S. travelers, an even larger 19 million U.S. residents visit Mexico each year.13 Just as social networks often facilitate the creation of commercial relationships within the United States, the depth and intensity of bilateral social integration spurs the development of economic links between the U.S. and Mexico. Import and export relationships, production sharing arrangements, and investment opportunities are all made easier by the relatively high level of understanding derived from the geographic and cultural proximity of United States and Mexico.

#### Our ev is predictive, relations are high now, and issues are compartmentalized – NGO’s fill in

Selee and Diaz-Cayeros 13 (Andrew and Alberto) “The Dynamics of US Mexico Relations” Mexico and the United States: the politics of partnership. 2013. Book

Yet positive factors favor prospects for more effective partnership and are likely to drive cooperation over time. First among these is the genuine interdependence of interests that underlies integration between the two countries. Everyday issues that need to be resolved – from the GM bailout to drug trafficking to natural disasters and water shortages at the border – create a dynamic of constant engagement around highly concrete topics that policymakers on the two sides of the border need to address. Moreover, the growing complexity of the relationship means that even when disputes arise among the two countries’ political leaders, progress continues along a number of other areas, driven by federal agencies, state, and local governments, and nongovernmental actors. Increasingly, interactions between the two countries take place simultaneously along a wide number of different points of engagement, which are largely independent of each other and have their own particular dynamics. Progress on one does not necessarily augur progress on another; nor does failure in one area lead to failure in another. Nonetheless, progress in depending engagement between the two countries will constantly be challenged by the persistent asymmetries that condition the relationship. The different in geopolitical realities of the two countries, the continuing inequality in average income between them and the dissimilar capacities of the two states are likely to continue to limit some efforts at greater cooperation. Recent tendencies have softened the impact of some of these asymmetries. Democratization in Mexico has made the political systems of the two countries more similar. Increased economic and social exchanges have built ties that mitigate some of the most visible asymmetries and forced the two countries to seek solutions to shared problems. Public opinion studies show how far the two countries have gone in recognizing their mutual interest in working together despite their differences, with ordinary citizens generally far ahead of political elites. Over the long term, interdependence will force the two countries closer and complexity will allow the relationship to lay down even deeper roots along multiple points of engagement. However, asymmetry will continue to create frictions and provide a brake on progress in cooperation. The relationship between the United States and Mexico will continuously deepen, but will be a process fraught with tension. The countries have ceased to be distant neighbors but as yet they remain far away from being strategic partners whose relationship is guided by a common vision of mutually beneficial shared outcomes.

#### Alt causes – poverty, Merida, and NAFTA

Hakim et al 2/1 – (Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue Andrés Rozental, member of the Advisor board, president of Rozental & Asociados in Mexico City and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas program at the Center for International Policy, Latin America Advisor, February 1, 2013 “Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?” <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3222>) DF

A: Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas program at the Center for International Policy: "All major issues at stake in U.S.-Mexico relations-immigration--labor, security, trade, environment, climate, human rights--will experience a turning point over the coming years. Immigration reform, likely to be accomplished, will improve relations depending on its final form; legal status would enfranchise U.S. Latinos, deepening democracy, and allow for travel. This will reunite families and increase citizen diplomacy between the two nations--both big pluses for the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Other changes will be mixed. Blind cooperation in the failed drug war through more Mérida Initiative funding will improve military/intelligence cooperation while propelling violence as it has for the past five years and adding to deteriorating human security conditions, militarization and corruption. Unfortunately, signs point to continuation without a comprehensive evaluation of the damage done to date--John Kerry reiterated support for the Bush-era plan in confirmation hearings and Medina-Mora's appointment sends a sign to Washington that the Peña Nieto government will accept the U.S. security aid strategy, since Medina-Mora was a point man for the drug war as attorney general in the first years of the Calderón government. Citizen calls for an end to support for Mexico's drug war will increase, but will face strong pushback from defense industry lobbies in Congress. As NAFTA reaches the 20-year mark, controversy surrounding outsourcing, jobs and union rights in the context of high U.S. unemployment will resurge--it will be interesting to see who Obama replaces Ron Kirk with as U.S. trade representative after Kirk took up the Republican banner of free-trade agreements. In Mexico, NAFTA evaluations cannot ignore the additional creation of millions of poor people, plunging real wages, the hugely skewed distribution of wealth and the environmental and social conflicts provoked by investment in extractive industries. The tension between corporate-led trade/investment promotion and the negative impact on workers will increase."

#### Drug trade declining but stable

WSJ 6/28 (Wall Street Journal, “Mexico Sees Decline in Drug-Related Killings”, June 28th, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324328204578573760968965312.html>)

Drug-related killings that turned parts of Mexico into the bloodiest spots on the globe appear to have decreased in recent months - a welcome trend in a nation exhausted by years of violence associated with organized crime, even if the reasons behind it are hard to pin down. The bloodshed is still alarmingly high, as the northern border and even the Acapulco beach resort continue to suffer from cartel turf wars. In his first six months in office, around 6,300 people died in killings seen as linked to organized crime. But that is a drop of about 18% compared with an estimated 7,700 in the previous six months. A separate study by a nonprofit group, the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness, used all reported murders, not just those classified as organized crime-related. It then seasonally adjusted the murder rates - since summer months tend to see a spike - and came up with a less-pronounced drop of 6% to around 10,000 murders, compared with about 10,600 in the six months before Mr. Peña Nieto took office. The study's lead author, Alejandro Hope, a former government intelligence official, said the seasonally adjusted decline seems to have flattened out in recent months, suggesting further gains may be hard to come by. "The situation is improving at a very slow rate," said Mr. Hope. "My nightmare scenario is that we get used to 20,000 or 25,000 people getting killed every year."

#### No chance of Mexico becoming a failed state and drug trade good – stabilizes Mexico’s economy

Friedman 10 **–** American political scientist, founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of private intelligence corporation STRATFOR, political science professor at Dickinson College, briefed senior commanders in the armed services, Office of Net Assessments, SHAPE technical center, the US Army War College, National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation (George, “Mexico and the Failed State Revisited”, 4/6/10; [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100405\_mexico\_and\_failed\_state\_revisited>)//Beddow](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100405_mexico_and_failed_state_revisited%3e)//Beddow)

STRATFOR argued March 13, 2008, that Mexico was nearing the status of a failed state. A failed state is one in which the central government has lost control over significant areas of the country and the state is unable to function. In revisiting this issue, it seems to us that the Mexican government has lost control of the northern tier of Mexico to drug-smuggling organizations, which have significantly greater power in that region than government forces. Moreover, the ability of the central government to assert its will against these organizations has weakened to the point that decisions made by the state against the cartels are not being implemented or are being implemented in a way that would guarantee failure. Despite these facts, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Mexico is becoming a failed state. Instead, it appears the Mexican state has accommodated itself to the situation. Rather than failing, it has developed strategies designed both to ride out the storm and to maximize the benefits of that storm for Mexico. First, while the Mexican government has lost control over matters having to do with drugs and with the borderlands of the United States, Mexico City's control over other regions -- and over areas other than drug enforcement -- has not collapsed (though its lack of control over drugs could well extend to other areas eventually). Second, while drugs reshape Mexican institutions dramatically, they also, paradoxically, stabilize Mexico. We need to examine these crosscurrents to understand the status of Mexico. Mexico's Core Problem Let's begin by understanding the core problem. The United States consumes vast amounts of narcotics, which, while illegal there, make their way in abundance. Narcotics derive from low-cost agricultural products that become consumable with minimal processing. With its long, shared border with the United States, Mexico has become a major grower, processor and exporter of narcotics. Because the drugs are illegal and thus outside normal market processes, their price is determined by their illegality rather than by the cost of production. This means extraordinary profits can be made by moving narcotics from the Mexican side of the border to markets on the other side. Whoever controls the supply chain from the fields to the processing facilities and, above all, across the border, will make enormous amounts of money. Various Mexican organizations -- labeled cartels, although they do not truly function as such, since real cartels involve at least a degree of cooperation among producers, not open warfare -- vie for this business. These are competing businesses, each with its own competing supply chain. Typically, competition among businesses involves lowering prices and increasing quality. This would produce small, incremental shifts in profits on the whole while dramatically reducing prices. An increased market share would compensate for lower prices. Similarly, lawsuits are the normal solution to unfair competition. But neither is the case with regard to illegal goods. The surest way to increase smuggling profits is not through market mechanisms but by taking over competitors' supply chains. Given the profit margins involved, persons wanting to control drug supply chains would be irrational to buy, since the lower-cost solution would be to take control of these supply chains by force. Thus, each smuggling organization has an attached paramilitary organization designed to protect its own supply chain and to seize its competitors' supply chains. The result is ongoing warfare between competing organizations. Given the amount of money being made in delivering their product to American cities, these paramilitary organizations are well-armed, well-led and well-motivated. Membership in such paramilitary groups offers impoverished young men extraordinary opportunities for making money, far greater than would be available to them in legitimate activities. The raging war in Mexico derives logically from the existence of markets for narcotics in the United States; the low cost of the materials and processes required to produce these products; and the extraordinarily favorable economics of moving narcotics across the border. This warfare is concentrated on the Mexican side of the border. But from the Mexican point of view, this warfare does not fundamentally threaten Mexico's interests. A Struggle Far From the Mexican Heartland The heartland of Mexico is to the south, far from the country's northern tier. The north is largely a sparsely populated highland desert region seen from Mexico City as an alien borderland intertwined with the United States as much as it is part of Mexico. Accordingly, the war raging there doesn't represent a direct threat to the survival of the Mexican regime. (click here to enlarge image) Indeed, what the wars are being fought over in some ways benefits Mexico. The amount of money pouring into Mexico annually is stunning. It is estimated to be about $35 billion to $40 billion each year. The massive profit margins involved make these sums even more significant. Assume that the manufacturing sector produces revenues of $40 billion a year through exports. Assuming a generous 10 percent profit margin, actual profits would be $4 billion a year. In the case of narcotics, however, profit margins are conservatively estimated to stand at around 80 percent. The net from $40 billion would be $32 billion; to produce equivalent income in manufacturing, exports would have to total $320 billion. In estimating the impact of drug money on Mexico, it must therefore be borne in mind that drugs cannot be compared to any conventional export. The drug trade's tremendously high profit margins mean its total impact on Mexico vastly outstrips even the estimated total sales, even if the margins shifted substantially. On the whole, Mexico is a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade. Even if some of the profits are invested overseas, the pool of remaining money flowing into Mexico creates tremendous liquidity in the Mexican economy at a time of global recession. It is difficult to trace where the drug money is going, which follows from its illegality. Certainly, drug dealers would want their money in a jurisdiction where it could not be easily seized even if tracked. U.S. asset seizure laws for drug trafficking make the United States an unlikely haven. Though money clearly flows out of Mexico, the ability of the smugglers to influence the behavior of the Mexican government by investing some of it makes Mexico a likely destination for a substantial portion of such funds. The money does not, however, flow back into the hands of the gunmen shooting it out on the border; even their bosses couldn't manage funds of that magnitude. And while money can be -- and often is -- baled up and hidden, the value of money is in its use. As with illegal money everywhere, the goal is to wash it and invest it in legitimate enterprises where it can produce more money. That means it has to enter the economy through legitimate institutions -- banks and other financial entities -- and then be redeployed into the economy. This is no different from the American Mafia's practice during and after Prohibition. The Drug War and Mexican National Interests From Mexico's point of view, interrupting the flow of drugs to the United States is not clearly in the national interest or in that of the economic elite. Observers often dwell on the warfare between smuggling organizations in the northern borderland but rarely on the flow of American money into Mexico. Certainly, that money could corrupt the Mexican state, but it also behaves as money does. It is accumulated and invested, where it generates wealth and jobs. For the Mexican government to become willing to shut off this flow of money, the violence would have to become far more geographically widespread. And given the difficulty of ending the traffic anyway -- and that many in the state security and military apparatus benefit from it -- an obvious conclusion can be drawn: Namely, it is difficult to foresee scenarios in which the Mexican government could or would stop the drug trade. Instead, Mexico will accept both the pain and the benefits of the drug trade. Mexico's policy is consistent: It makes every effort to appear to be stopping the drug trade so that it will not be accused of supporting it. The government does not object to disrupting one or more of the smuggling groups, so long as the aggregate inflow of cash does not materially decline. It demonstrates to the United States efforts (albeit inadequate) to tackle the trade, while pointing out very real problems with its military and security apparatus and with its officials in Mexico City. It simultaneously points to the United States as the cause of the problem, given Washington's failure to control demand or to reduce prices by legalization. And if massive amounts of money pour into Mexico as a result of this U.S. failure, Mexico is not going to refuse it. The problem with the Mexican military or police is not lack of training or equipment. It is not a lack of leadership. These may be problems, but they are only problems if they interfere with implementing Mexican national policy. The problem is that these forces are personally unmotivated to take the risks needed to be effective because they benefit more from being ineffective. This isn't incompetence but a rational national policy. Moreover, Mexico has deep historic grievances toward the United States dating back to the Mexican-American War. These have been exacerbated by U.S. immigration policy that the Mexicans see both as insulting and as a threat to their policy of exporting surplus labor north. There is thus no desire to solve the Americans' problem. Certainly, there are individuals in the Mexican government who wish to stop the smuggling and the inflow of billions of dollars. They will try. But they will not succeed, as too much is at stake. One must ignore public statements and earnest private assurances and instead observe the facts on the ground to understand what's really going on. The U.S. Strategic Problem And this leaves the United States with a strategic problem. There is some talk in Mexico City and Washington of the Americans becoming involved in suppression of the smuggling within Mexico (even though the cartels, to use that strange name, make certain not to engage in significant violence north of the border and mask it when they do to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexico). This is certainly something the Mexicans would be attracted to. But it is unclear that the Americans would be any more successful than the Mexicans. What is clear is that any U.S. intervention would turn Mexican drug traffickers into patriots fighting yet another Yankee incursion. Recall that Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, but he did help turn Villa into a national hero in Mexico. The United States has a number of choices. It could accept the status quo. It could figure out how to reduce drug demand in the United States while keeping drugs illegal. It could legalize drugs, thereby driving their price down and ending the motivation for smuggling. And it could move into Mexico in a bid to impose its will against a government, banking system and police and military force that benefit from the drug trade. The United States does not know how to reduce demand for drugs. The United States is not prepared to legalize drugs. This means the choice lies between the status quo and a complex and uncertain (to say the least) intervention. We suspect the United States will attempt some limited variety of the latter, while in effect following the current strategy and living with the problem. Ultimately, Mexico is a failed state only if you accept the idea that its goal is to crush the smugglers. If, on the other hand, one accepts the idea that all of Mexican society benefits from the inflow of billions of American dollars (even though it also pays a price), then the Mexican state has not failed -- it is following a rational strategy to turn a national problem into a national benefit.

#### Political institutions check instability

Coll 12 (Alberto R., Professor of International Law – DePaul College of Law, Former Chairman of the Strategic Research Department – U.S. Naval War College, Former Dean – Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, “The Real Latin American Revolution”, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 5-17, http://2012summits.org/commentaries/detail/coll\_2, Deech)

With the G8 gathering in Camp David and the NATO summit in Chicago, it is easy to lose sight of one of the key revolutions in global affairs over the past fifteen years: the rise of Latin America. Until not long ago, Latin America was synonymous with instability, revolution, and economic stagnation. For much of the Cold War, two highly destructive forces dominated Latin American politics. One was the tendency of its powerful militaries to block any progressive reform by installing repressive regimes, many of which went on to commit appalling human rights atrocities in the name of fighting communism. The other was the penchant of Latin America’s elites for protectionism, populism, and revolution as panaceas for the region’s ills. The results were political conflict, massive poverty, and limited clout in global affairs. In the 1970s and 1980s, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were left behind by the likes of China, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, which had been backwaters only a few decades earlier. Today, Latin America is an economically dynamic region with a growing voice in international affairs. Symbolically enough, the June meeting of the G20 group of world economic powers will take place in Mexico, and three Latin American countries—Brazil, Mexico and Argentina—now count among its highly sought-after ranks. Elsewhere, the latest new member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—the mostly European and North American group of democracies committed to a free market economy—is Chile, invited to join in 2010 on the basis of its impressive economic performance and political stability. Several developments help to explain Latin America’s resurgence. The first is political. With notable exceptions such as Venezuela and parts of Central America, political institutions have matured and democratic practices have strengthened. In most countries, the military has retreated from politics, ceding space to a vigorous civil society. There were over thirty military coups in the region between 1975 and 1985. In the past decade there was only one (in Honduras).

**Global democracy inevitable**

**Tow 10**—Director of the Future Planet Research Centre(David, Future Society- The Future of Democracy, 26 August 2010, http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=4280:future-society-the-future-of-democracy&catid=76:david-tow&Itemid=230, AMiles)

Democracy, as with all other processes engineered by human civilisation, is evolving at a rapid rate. A number of indicators are pointing to a major leap forward, encompassing a more public participatory form of democratic model and the harnessing of the expert intelligence of the Web. **By the middle of the 21st century, such a global version of the democratic process will be largely in place.** Democracy has a long evolutionary history. The concept of democracy - the notion that men and women have the right to govern themselves, was practised at around 2,500 BP in Athens. The Athenian polity or political body, granted all citizens the right to be heard and to participate in the major decisions affecting their rights and well-being. The City State demanded services and loyalty from the individual in return. There is evidence however that the role of popular assembly actually arose earlier in some Phoenician cities such as Sidon and Babylon in the ancient assemblies of Syria- Mesopotamia, as an organ of local government and justice. As demonstrated in these early periods, democracy, although imperfect, offered each individual a stake in the nation’s collective decision-making processes. It therefore provided a greater incentive for each individual to cooperate to increase group productivity. Through a more open decision process, improved innovation and consequently additional wealth was generated and distributed more equitably. An increase in overall economic wellbeing in turn generated more possibilities and potential to acquire knowledge, education and employment, coupled with greater individual choice and freedom. According to the Freedom House Report, an independent survey of political and civil liberties around the globe, the world has made great strides towards democracy in the 20th and 21st centuries. In 1900 there were 25 restricted democracies in existence covering an eighth of the world’s population, but none that could be judged as based on universal suffrage. The US and Britain denied voting rights to women and in the case of the US, also to African Americans. But at the end of the 20th century 119 of the world’s 192 nations were declared electoral democracies. In the current century, democracy continues to spread through Africa and Asia and significantly also the Middle East, with over 130 states in various stages of democratic evolution. Dictatorships or quasi democratic one party states still exist in Africa, Asia and the middle east with regimes such as China, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Burma, the Sudan, Belarus and Saudi Arabia, seeking to maintain total control over their populations. However two thirds of sub-Saharan countries have staged elections in the past ten years, with coups becoming less common and internal wars gradually waning. African nations are also starting to police human rights in their own region. African Union peacekeepers are now deployed in Darfur and are working with UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The evolution of democracy can also be seen in terms of improved human rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several ensuing legal treaties, define political, cultural and economic rights as well as the rights of women, children, ethnic groups and religions. This declaration is intended to create a global safety net of rights applicable to all peoples everywhere, with no exceptions. It also recognises the principle of the subordination of national sovereignty to the universality of human rights; the dignity and worth of human life beyond the jurisdiction of any State. **The global spread of democracy is** now also **irreversibly linked to the new cooperative globalisation model**. The EU, despite its growing pains, provides a compelling template; complementing national decisions in the supra-national interest at the commercial, financial, legal, health and research sharing level. The global spread of new technology and knowledge also provides the opportunity for developing countries to gain a quantum leap in material wellbeing; an essential prerequisite for a stable democracy. The current cyber-based advances therefore presage a much more interactive public form of democracy and mark the next phase in its ongoing evolution. Web 2.0’s social networking, blogging, messaging and video services have already significantly changed the way people discuss political issues and exchange ideas beyond national boundaries. In addition a number of popular sites exist as forums to actively harness individual opinions and encourage debate about contentious topics, funnelling them to political processes. These are often coupled to online petitions, allowing the public to deliver requests to Government and receive a committed response. In addition there are a plethora of specialized smart search engines and analytical tools aimed at locating and interpreting information about divisive and complex topics such as global warming and medical stem cell advances. These are increasingly linked to Argumentation frameworks and Game theory, aimed at supporting the logical basis of arguments, negotiation and other structured forms of group decision-making. New logic and statistical tools can also provide inference and evaluation mechanisms to better assess the evidence for a particular hypothesis. By 2030 it is likely that such ‘intelligence-based’ algorithms will be capable of automating the analysis and advice provided to politicians, at a similar level of quality and expertise as that offered by the best human advisers. It might be argued that there is still a need for the role of politicians and leaders in assessing and prioritising such expert advice in the overriding national interest. But a moment’s reflection leads to the opposite conclusion. Politicians have party allegiances and internal obligations that can and do create serious conflicts of interest and skew the best advice. History is replete with such disastrous decisions based on false premises, driven by party political bias and populist fads predicated on flawed knowledge. One needs to look no further in recent times than the patently inadequate evidential basis for the US’s war in Iraq which has cost at least half a million civilian lives and is still unresolved. However there remains a disjunction between the developed west and those developing countries only now recovering from colonisation, the subsequent domination by dictators and fascist regimes and ongoing natural disasters. There is in fact a time gap of several hundred years between the democratic trajectory of the west and east, which these countries are endeavouring to bridge within a generation; often creating serious short-term challenges and cultural dislocations. A very powerful enabler for the spread of democracy as mentioned is the Internet/Web- today’s storehouse of the world’s information and expertise. By increasing the flow of essential intelligence it facilitates transparency, reduces corruption, empowers dissidents and ensures governments are more responsive to their citizen’s needs. Ii is already providing the infrastructure for the emergence of a more democratic society; empowering all people to have direct input into critical decision processes affecting their lives, without the distortion of political intermediaries. **By 2040 more democratic outcomes for all populations on the planet will be the norm**. Critical and urgent decisions relating to global warming, financial regulation, economic allocation of scarce resources such as food and water, humanitarian rights and refugee migration etc, will to be sifted through community knowledge, resulting in truly representative and equitable global governance. Implementation of the democratic process itself will continue to evolve with new forms of e-voting and governance supervision, which will include the active participation of advocacy groups supported by a consensus of expert knowledge via the Intelligent Web 4.0. Over time democracy as with all other social processes, will evolve to best suit the needs of its human environment. It will emerge as a networked model- a non-hierarchical, resilient protocol, responsive to rapid social change. Such distributed forms of government will involve local communities, operating with the best expert advice from the ground up; the opposite of political party self-interested power and superficial focus-group decision-making, as implemented by many current political systems. These are frequently unresponsive to legitimate minority group needs and can be easily corrupted by powerful lobby groups, such as those employed by the heavy carbon emitters in the global warming debate.

**Democracy doesn’t solve war**

**Mueller 9**—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State, Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy, AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.PDF, AMiles)

In the last couple of decades there has been a burgeoning and intriguing discussion about the connection between democracy and war aversion.7 Most notable has been the empirical observation that democracies have never, or almost never, gotten into a war with each other. This relationship seems more correlative than causal, however. Like many important ideas over the last few centuries, the idea that war is undesirable and inefficacious and the idea that democracy is a good form of government have largely followed the same trajectory: they were embraced first in northern Europe and North America and then gradually, with a number of traumatic setbacks, became more accepted elsewhere. In this view, the rise of democracy not only is associated with the rise of war aversion, but also with the decline of slavery, religion, capital punishment, and cigarette smoking, and with the growing acceptance of capitalism, scientific methodology, women's rights, environmentalism, abortion, and rock music.8 While democracy and war aversion have taken much the same trajectory, however, they have been substantially out of synchronization with each other: the movement toward democracy began about 200 years ago, but the movement against war really began only about 100 years ago (Mueller 1989, 2004). Critics of the democracy/peace connection often cite examples of wars or near-wars between democracies. Most of these took place before World War I--that is, before war aversion had caught on.9 A necessary, logical connection between democracy and war aversion, accordingly, is far from clear. Thus, it is often asserted that democracies are peaceful because they apply their domestic penchant for peaceful compromise (something, obviously, that broke down in the United States in 1861) to the international arena or because the structure of democracy requires decision-makers to obtain domestic approval.10 But authoritarian regimes must also necessarily develop skills at compromise in order to survive, and they all have domestic constituencies that must be serviced such as the church, the landed gentry, potential urban rioters, the nomenklatura, the aristocracy, party members, the military, prominent business interests, the police or secret police, lenders of money to the exchequer, potential rivals for the throne, the sullen peasantry.11 Since World War I, the democracies in the developed world have been in the lead in rejecting war as a methodology. Some proponents of the democracy-peace connection suggest that this is because the democratic norm of non-violent conflict resolution has been externalized to the international arena. However, developed democracies have not necessarily adopted a pacifist approach, particularly after a version of that approach failed so spectacularly to prevent World War II from being forced upon them. In addition, they were willing actively to subvert or to threaten and sometimes apply military force when threats appeared to loom during the Cold War contest. At times this approach was used even against regimes that had some democratic credentials such as in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, and perhaps Nicaragua in the 1980s (Rosato 2003, 590-91). And, they have also sometimes used military force in their intermittent efforts to police the post-Cold War world (Mueller 2004, chs. 7, 8). It is true that they have warred little or not at all against each other--and, since there were few democracies outside the developed world until the last quarter of the twentieth century, it is this statistical regularity that most prominently informs the supposed connection between democracy and peace. However, the developed democracies hardly needed democracy to decide that war among them was a bad idea.12 In addition, they also adopted a live-and-let-live approach toward a huge number of dictatorships and other non-democracies that did not seem threatening during the Cold War--in fact, they often aided and embraced such regimes if they seemed to be on the right side in the conflict with Communism. Moreover, the supposed penchant for peaceful compromise of democracies has not always served them well when confronted with civil war situations, particularly ones involving secessionist demands. The process broke down into civil warfare in democratic Switzerland in 1847 and savagely so in the United States in 1861. Democracies have also fought a considerable number of wars to retain colonial possessions--six by France alone since World War II--and these, as James Fearon and David Laitin suggest, can in many respects be considered essentially to be civil wars (2003, 76). To be sure, democracies have often managed to deal with colonial problems peacefully, mostly by letting the colonies go. But authoritarian governments have also done so: the Soviet Union, for example, withdrew from his empire in Eastern Europe and then dissolved itself, all almost entirely without violence. Thus, while democracy and war aversion have often been promoted by the same advocates, **the relationship does not seem to be a causal one**. And when the two trends are substantially out of step today, democracies will fight one another. Thus, it is not at all clear that telling the elected hawks in the Jordanian parliament that Israel is a democracy will dampen their hostility in the slightest. And various warlike sentiments could be found in the elected parliaments in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s or in India and then-democratic Pakistan when these two countries engaged in armed conflict in 1999. If Argentina had been a democracy in 1982 when it seized the Falkland Islands (a very popular undertaking), it is unlikely that British opposition to the venture would have been much less severe. "The important consideration," observes Miriam Fendius Elman after surveying the literature on the subject, does not seem to be "whether a country is democratic or not, but whether its ruling coalition is committed to peaceful methods of conflict resolution." As she further points out, the countries of Latin America and most of Africa have engaged in very few international wars even without the benefit of being democratic (for a century before its 1982 adventure, Argentina, for example, fought none at all) (1997, 484, 496). (Interestingly, although there has also been scarcely any warfare between Latin American states for over 100 years or among Arab ones or European ones for more that 50--in all cases whether democratic or not--this impressive phenomenon has inspired remarkably few calls for worldwide Arab colonialism or for the systematic transplant of remaining warlike states to Latin America or Europe.) And, of course, the long peace enjoyed by developed countries since World War II includes not only the one that has prevailed between democracies, but also the even more important one between the authoritarian east and the democratic west. Even if there is some connection, whether causal or atmospheric, between democracy and peace, it cannot explain this latter phenomenon. Democracy and the democratic peace become mystiques: the role of philosophers and divines Democracy has been a matter of debate for several millennia as philosophers and divines have speculated about what it is, what it might become, and what it ought to be. Associated with these speculations has been a tendency to emboss the grubby gimmick with something of a mystique. Of particular interest for present purposes is the fanciful notion that democracy does not simply express and aggregate preferences, but actually somehow creates (or should create) them. In addition, the (rough) correlation between democracy and war aversion has also been elevated into a causal relationship.

**Terrorists can’t use bioweapons**

**Leitenberg, IR prof, 5—**Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles) Ellipses in original

Five essential requirements must be mastered in order to produce biological agents: • One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen. • One must know how to handle the organism correctly. • One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics. • One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up production properly. • One must know how to disperse the product properly. 139 A U.S. military field manual dating back to the 1960s remarks on the attributes of a desirable BW agent, that in addition to its pathogenicity, “means must be available for maintaining the agent’s virulence or infectivity during production, storage, and transportation.” 140 One should add, most particularly during its dispersal as well. Two members of Sweden’s biodefense program stress methods on how to optimize formulations of BW agents as the most critical step of all: “They key competence is . . . how to formulate the organisms to facilitate aerosolization of particles that cause severe disease by inhalation.” 141 It is interesting that the classified 1999 DIA report quoted earlier in the section on state programs contained a single sentence regarding the possible use of BW agents by terrorist groups: “Terrorist use should also be anticipated primarily in improvised devices, probably in association with an explosive.” 142 No anticipation of the capability for aerosol distribution was mentioned, no overflight of cities, sports stadiums, etc. In a recent BW “Risk Assessment” published elsewhere, a group of authors from the Sandia National Laboratory listed a series of factors closely paralleling the above as “Technical Hurdles to Successful BW Deployment”: acquisition of a virulent agent; production of the agent in suitable form and quantity; and, effective deployment of the agent. This was summed up in simple words as “obtaining a pathogen or toxin . . ., isolation, amplification, protection against environmental degradation, and development of an effective dissemination method.” They concluded that “Even a low-consequence event requires a 47 considerable level of expertise to execute.” 143 Dr. Steven Block, Chair of the U.S. DoD Defense Science Board Summer Study on biological weapons in the late 1990s explained the same requirements. A lesson from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that any group bent on developing offensive bio-weapons capabilities must overcome two significant problems, one biological and the other physical. First, it must acquire and produce stable quantities of a suitably potent agent. For a variety of reasons, this is not the trivial task that it is sometimes made out to be. Second, it must have an effective means of delivering the agent to the intended target. For most, but not all, bio-weapon agents, this translates into solving problems of dispersal. Programs in both the United States and the USSR devoted years of effort to perfecting these aspects. 144 Unfortunately, a recent example provides the sort of grossly uninformed description that is more frequently provided to the general public. Speaking at the Harvard Medical School on June 1, 2005, and trading on his training as a medical doctor as he frequently does, Senator Frist claimed that “. . . a few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently innocuous setting [could] mount a first- order biological attack. It is even possible to synthesize virulent pathogens from scratch, or to engineer and manufacture prions . . .” He repeated that this was “the single greatest threat to our safety and security today.” 145 The remarks are a travesty: “. . . a few technicians . . . middling skill . . . few thousand dollars,” leading to a “first-order ading to a “ ading to a “ ” a biological attack, and additionally extending this to “synthesizing virulent pathogens” in the same breath. To bolster his argument, Senator Frist larded his presentation with other gross inaccuracies, claiming that “During the Cold War, the Soviet Union . . . stockpiled 5,000 tons annually of biowarfare- engineered anthrax resistant to 16 antibiotics.” The only source in the world for the tonnage of anthrax stockpiled by the USSR is Dr. Ken Alibek. 146 He has never quoted a figure higher than 200 tons, and he has never claimed that the 200 tons was produced “annually,” or in any single year. The USSR’s anthrax stockpile consisted of a genetically unmodified classical strain (or strains). 147 The antibiotic resistant strain which was developed by Soviet BW laboratories in the mid- to late-1980s was not resistant to 16 antibiotics, but to half that number, and had not yet reached the point of being stockpiled Page 56 48 by the time that the Soviet BW program began to be cut back in 1989. Finally, the 5,000-ton figure is the approximate sum of the annual production capacities of all Soviet-era BW mobilization production facilities that would have initiated production only with the onset of, or just prior to a (nuclear) war with the United States. No such quantities of BW agents were ever produced in the USSR

**No extinction**

**O’Neill 4** O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

**Status quo preparedness solves**

**Science Centric 9** (Study finds program has improved health agencies' preparedness for bioterror and disease outbreaks, 25 March 2009, http://www.sciencecentric.com/news/article.php?q=09032505-study-finds-program-has-improved-health-agencies-preparedness-bioterror-disease-outbreaks, Amiles)

A federal program designed to help metropolitan public health agencies prepare to deliver essential medicines to the public after a large-scale bioterror attack or natural disease outbreak has succeeded in improving the level of readiness, according to a new RAND Corporation study. Researchers found that the federal Cities Readiness Initiative, a program active in 72 metropolitan areas, appears to have improved agencies' ability to rapidly and widely dispense life-saving medications and other medical supplies in the event of a large-scale bioterror attack or a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak. The study from RAND Health concludes there is merit in extending the program so the impact can be further monitored, although the analysis did not assess the cost-effectiveness of the effort or compare it to other public health priorities. 'The Cities Readiness Initiative has helped agencies in the nation's most-populous regions become better able to dispense life-saving medication following a bioterrorism event or after an infectious disease outbreak,' said Henry Willis, the study's lead author and a policy researcher at RAND, a non-profit research organisation. Researchers concluded that a key reason the Cities Readiness Initiative has helped promote improvements has been its focus on a single scenario with a well-defined numeric goal and the technical assistance it has provided to public health officials. Researchers say the initiative has helped increase the number of local public health staff members working on medication dispensing planning, strengthened partnerships between public health officials and local first-responder agencies, and helped pay for new equipment such as mobile drug dispensing units. Other public health improvements fostered by the Cities Readiness Initiative are the development of more-detailed plans for medication dispensing, including creation of new strategies that rely less on medically trained staff and take greater advantage of nontraditional venues such as hotels, resorts, churches as well as drive-through dispensing in parking lots and fairgrounds. The Cities Readiness Initiative was created in 2004 to improve the ability of the nation's largest metropolitan regions to provide life-saving medications in the event of a large-scale bioterror attack or naturally occurring disease outbreak. The program has spent about $300 million on efforts thus far. Administered by the federal Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the program helps jurisdictions improve their ability to provide antibiotics and other life-saving medications to 100 percent of a region's population within 48 hours of a large-scale anthrax attack or large-scale infectious disease emergency. The 72 regions that have received funding account for about 57 percent of the nation's population. RAND researchers conducted their study by reviewing plans and technical surveys completed by agencies that assessed capabilities in 12 functional areas (e.g., distribution of medication, dispensing of antibiotics), as well as conducting in-depth interviews with officials from nine regions.

**The threat of bioterror is hype**

**Reynolds, Former economic director at Hudson 5—**Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Formerly Director of Economic Research at the Hudson Institute. AB in economics from UCLA. (Alan, WMD Doomsday Distractions, 10 April 2005, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=4235, AMiles)

The report lacked not merely facts but common sense. The commission found the CIA's worst errors were due "chiefly to flaws in analysis," and to the "fundamental assumptions and premises of its analytic judgments," and "an inferential leap." The panel blamed insufficient imagination. The greater danger may be too much imagination -- dreaming up long-shot science-fiction scenarios, like those recently leaked from the Homeland Security Department involving demonstrably ineffective agents delivered by inexplicable devices. In the partially prescient 1996 Kurt Russell film "Executive Decision," Islamic terrorists hijack an airliner to kill "millions of Americans" with bombs filled with sarin nerve gas. Jet fuel would have been a less thrilling yet more realistic threat. As the Economist noted two weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: "Although a few molecules of sarin are enough to kill a person, it takes hundreds of pounds of chemicals to achieve that concentration in an open air attack." On Oct. 2, 2001, the Washington Post's reporters Joby Warrick and Joe Stephens found defense and intelligence agencies had become so enthralled with sarin, smallpox and other hypothetical "weapons of mass destruction" they didn't connect three dots: commercial planes were often hijacked; jet fuel is explosive; suicidal terrorist tactics are common. The article revealed "elaborate multiagency planning exercises with flashy names such as 'Red Ex' and 'Dark Winter' focused overwhelmingly on biological and chemical threats, while experts urging preparations for a simpler, more conventional attack found it difficult to be heard. ... Lots of money poured into research on chemical and biological threats. Entire research institutes were created for it." The postwar death toll from bioterrorism is only six -- five Americans from anthrax and one Bulgarian assassinated with ricin. The death toll from chemical terrorism is 26 -- 19 from sarin gas in Japanese subways a decade ago and seven in Chicago in 1982 killed by Tylenol laced with cyanide. In March 1999, The Post's science writer Daniel Greenberg already sensed a "whiff of hysteria-fanning and budget opportunism in the scary scenarios of the saviors who have stepped forward against the menace of bioterrorism." Today, the federal cost of this bioterrorism bonanza is $7.9 billion a year -- nearly $2 billion for each known victim of bioterrorism. Yet taxpayers are still assaulted by periodic hysteria-fanning studies from opportunistic institutes claiming, "The United States remains woefully unprepared to protect the public against terrorists wielding biological agents." Lumping nuclear weapons with a hodgepodge of biological and chemical agents as weapons of "mass" destruction is intended to imply germs and chemicals are as dangerous as nuclear bombs. In a January 2003 speech, former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz claimed Iraq had enough ricin to kill "more than 1 million people," botulinum toxin (botox) "to kill tens of millions" and anthrax "to kill hundreds of millions." To use ricin to kill many people, someone would have to dump hundreds of tons of it on a small area. To kill many with anthrax or botox, someone would have to first get the victims to sniff weapons-grade anthrax or eat botulism-contaminated food and then shun antibiotics or antitoxins. Four months before the September 11 attacks, the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a "Dark Winter" war game that assumed the smallpox virus could somehow be released in three shopping malls without anyone noticing, leaving 3,000 unknowingly infected. Each victim was (wrongly) assumed to infect 10 more, through casual contact with travelers who didn't notice their pox. Compounding supposedly resulted in a million deaths within two months. Dark Winter was cited as a reason the Bush administration spent a half-billion dollars on 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine and tried to force risky vaccinations on first responders. Wall Street Journal science columnist Sharon Belgey debunked "Dark Winter" in November 2002, quoting Swiss expert Peter Merkle about "the sensationalistic press and marketing hype emerging from the burgeoning biodefense industry." "Dark Winter" assumed everyone infected spread the infection to 10 others, but teams of researchers say the scenario is tenfold too large. "Smallpox spreads slowly and is not very contagious," Miss Begley noted. Smallpox symptoms are quite visible, which acts like a big quarantine sign. Even a partial quarantine and local vaccinations have proven effective against smallpox. After the Iraq invasion turned up no WMD, a Wall Street Journal editorial seized on inspector David Kay's mention of Iraqi research on aflatoxin -- a carcinogenic mold that is researched because excessive aflatoxin on nuts can result in export bans. A U.S. lab worker once tried to commit suicide by ingesting a lot of aflatoxin, but failed. To use aflatoxin, anthrax, botox or ricin to kill more than a half-dozen people, you have to imagine some device for effectively delivering such agents. When it came to imaginary delivery systems, WMD fear-mongering escalated to the absurd. The 2002 British dossier claimed, "Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles." But biological agents (except ricin) are living organisms, which would be killed by any bomb, shell or missile. Chemical agents are liquid at room temperature, not gaseous, and most effective in closed spaces like a subway car or building. Chemical agents can be delivered by artillery shells, but how could terrorists sneak into a city with a 4-ton Howitzer? If terrorists can attack us with artillery shells, free-fall bombs or missiles, we should worry far more about conventional explosives than sarin shellings or aflatoxin bombs. Former Secretary of State Powell told the United Nations that Iraq had "ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air." But few biological agents (except anthrax) can survive sunlight, and none can survive chlorine. And it would take many huge trucks to poison a small water reservoir. What about fears of biological agents dispersed indiscriminately into the air? Scenario spinners speculate about mixing anthrax with water and somehow spraying it (without detection) from trucks, crop dusters or unmanned aircraft. But to die from anthrax, you need to inhale thousands of spores. Those spores clump together and mix with dust, yet they must end up neither too large nor too small, or else they would be sneezed out, coughed up or swallowed. Even if enough particles of the perfect size could be sprayed into the breezes, the odds are extremely low of infecting more than few dozen people that way. And none would die if they took Cipro promptly. The biggest danger of past and present alarmist statements about biological terrorism is that endless exaggeration of low-probability events continues diverting limited attention and resources away from real weapons real terrorists really use -- airplanes, machine guns, arson, suicide bombs and car bombs.

### 1NC – Trade

**Interdependence doesn’t solve conflict**

**May 5 —** Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Principal Investigator for the DHS. (Michael, “The U.S.-China Strategic Relationship,” September 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Sep/maySep05.asp, AMiles)

However important and beneficial this interdependence may be from an economic point of view, it is not likely to be a significant factor for strategic stability. Famously, economists before World War I sounded clear warnings that Europe had become economically interdependent to an extent that war there would ruin Europe. The war was fought nevertheless, Europe was duly ruined, and the ensuing political consequences haunted Europe to the end of World War II. Other cases exist. Modern war has been an economic disaster. Economic realities, including economic interdependence, play little role in whether a country goes to war or not. Economic myths certainly do and they usually affect strategic stability quite negatively. This is another reason why domestic perceptions matter: they determine which myths are believed.

**Regional FTAs check the impact**

**Barnett 9 —** senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx, AMiles)

Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

**No protectionism and no impact**

**Anderson 9** — head of Asia-Pacific Economics for UBS (Jonathan, Reality Check for Prophets of Protectionism, 17 August 2009, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-17/110225722.html, AMiles)

Now, here we are again, at the beginning of what some commentators call the "Great Depression II." And according to the World Trade Organization, we are seeing a sharp uptick in protectionist measures around the world. Are we risking another wave of trade destruction that closes the world's doors? And could a new wave crush China and the rest of the emerging world? The short answer is no. We do not worry much about the protectionism issue. We think these fears are vastly overstated for four reasons. First, conditions in the global economy are not that bad. If we look back at the Great Depression in the 1930s, we find the United States economy contracted nearly 30 percent in real terms, and more than a quarter of the entire workforce was unemployed. Up to one-third of the economy simply disappeared. In many European economies, the impact was greater still. How do things look today? At last count, the United States, euro zone countries, and Japan had seen a cumulative GDP contraction of 6 percent or so, with average unemployment nearing 9 percent. And this is probably as bad as it will get; the world economy is now expected to stabilize and recover in the second half of 2009. Of course, the recovery may be extremely weak. But even if developed countries don't grow at all over the next 18 months, the situation still compares favorably with the events of 75 years ago. In other words, there's just no reason to look for the same kind of protectionist reaction today. We should add that we're not seeing it. The WTO has reported a sharp increase in various protectionist actions, claims and cases, but the overall economic impact of these measures is still small by any standard. This is likely to be the worst it will get. Second, the effects of "plain vanilla" protectionism are highly exaggerated. Although Smoot-Hawley passed in 1930, raising tariffs on thousands of products, most economists agree the real attack on global trade didn't come until the breakup of the international monetary and exchange rate arrangements in 1931, and a corresponding collapse of global finance. Of course, many pundits now worry about the fall of the U.S. dollar as a global invoicing and reserve currency, and that this could have a similarly negative impact on trade and financing. However, we should stress that as bad as the U.S. economy looks at present, it's still the best thing we have. The European Union is beset by crushing regional disparities and political pressures, with significant basket cases hiding inside its borders. Japan simply doesn't have the necessary dynamism or commitment to globalization. And as far as fiscal balance sheets are concerned, all three major regions have equally significant problems. The United States stands alone in terms of how fast the Federal Reserve has expanded its monetary balance sheet, raising specific concerns about U.S. inflation and its impact on the dollar. But as one can see by looking at U.S. economic data, we are still falling into a deflation cycle for the time being, with nary a hint of inflationary pressure yet. We fully expect the Fed to be able to rein in the monetary expansion quickly if these pressures arise. We should add that, although it's fashionable to look at China and the yuan as a rising competitor to the dollar, this is simply not a realistic theme for the next 10 years – and perhaps for much longer. China doesn't have an open capital account, which means there is little opportunity or interest in holding the yuan as a serious asset. If anything, the impact of the current global crisis is likely to convince mainland authorities to be slow in opening their borders. China also doesn't have the kind of deep, domestic financial markets required of a global reserve currency; the bond market in particular is still in its infancy. As a result, it will be a long time indeed before the yuan starts playing a real role on the global stage. Third, even if we do see an unexpected wave of protectionism, emerging countries have less to lose than the developed world. Let's start by asking this question: When we talk about "protectionism," what exactly are we trying to protect? The answer is, of course, domestic workers and domestic jobs. In what areas do the labor forces of the United States, Europe and Japan work? The vast majority are in services and construction, sectors that don't compete much directly on the international arena. Only 10 to 15 percent are manufacturing jobs, and these are mostly in capital intensive, high-tech industries such as autos, precision machinery and high-end electronics. By contrast, manufactured goods that China and other emerging markets sell – toys, textiles, running shoes, sporting goods, light electronics, etc. – are barely made at all in the G3 countries. Rich countries outsourced most of these low-end, labor-intensive jobs a long time ago. A related point holds for commodities and raw materials, which make up much of the rest of the exports from the low-income world. All three major, developed regions are heavily dependent on imported resources, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The bottom line here is that even if we do get a big wave of protectionism in developed countries, it unlikely to be aimed specifically at low-end goods from the developed world. Rather, it makes more sense to protect the auto industry along with high-end equipment and chemical manufacturers. Moreover, any tariffs and barriers placed on toys and textiles are much more likely to raise consumer prices than crush volumes, given the absence of competitive domestic industries that could take advantage of protection to grab local market shares. The final point concerns financial leverage. There has never been a time in recent global economic history when the developed world was so dependent on low-income countries for financial resources. For the first time, the emerging world is a net financial creditor. Given the rapid expansion of public debts, the major developed countries are extremely interested in seeing China and other low-income countries continue to buy U.S. Treasuries, Japanese Government Bonds and various European debt instruments. The impact of a big, potential pullout from global bond markets actually could be much more negative than positive in terms of protecting domestic industries. So emerging markets now are in a much better bargaining position than at any time in the past. Protectionist fears are likely to continue to bother investors over the next year or two, and perhaps longer. But we don't think the real situation supports these fears.

**Plurilateralism checks the impact to trade**

**Jha 2** project coordinator and representative to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Taught international economics and managerial economics at Oxford, University. B.A. from Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics from the Delhi School of Economics and the University of London, respectively(Veena Jha, Project Coordinator of UNTAD-Dehli, 2002, Salvaging the WTO’s Future, ed. Dasgupta, p. 461)

All these criticisms of the WTO must be viewed against the backdrop of the difficulties and sometimes even the impossibility of negotiating multilateral agreements with such a diverse membership as that of the WTO. In this milieu doing away with the WTO may be an impossibility and a forum for trade negotiations or certainly trade disputes may be an economic necessity. However diluting the power of the WTO and the development of a pluralistic world order, which provides the economic space for countries to undertake activist trade and industrial policies may be a feasible option. The alternative to the WTO, which is constantly loading the agenda with newer and newer public and domestic policy issues, is not a Hobbesian state of nature. The reality of today’s economic relations is a world marked by a multiplicity of international and regional institutions that check one another. Of course the threat of unilateral action by the powerful is always present in a plurilateral system of several coexisting institutions. However, the powerful also hesitate to take such action as it may threaten the legitimacy of these institutions as well as lead to the formation of opposing coalitions.

**Multilateral trade arrangements kill heg – turns case**

Paul B. **Stephan** III, University of Virginia School of Law, May **2000**, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=224802

In the five years that the WTO dispute resolution process has been up and running, the United States has faced setbacks in three important policy arenas. The WTO denounced its efforts to take the lead in protecting migrating wildlife, refused to challenge opaque relationships between bureaucracies and domestic producers that may harm its exporters, and thwarted its attempt to reconcile its income tax, with its perverse effects on exporters**,** with a consumption-tax world. These defeats havesignificancein and of themselves**,** because they complicate U.S. efforts to address problems affecting many billions of dollars in trade, investment and revenues. Just as outcomes, the WTO decisions suggest serious limitations on the ability of the United States to shape the international environment**.** The way the WTO organs have justified their decisions may have even greater significance.They talk as if they have lawmaking power, in the same sense that a common law court creates, and does not just interpret, norms of conduct**.** Moreover**,** they exercise their discretionary authority in a manner that expands their power at the expense of the United States. By insisting on a tight fit between trade sanctions and their professed objectives, the organs reduce the ability of the United States to use economic rewards and punishments to maximize its overall influence**.** By refusing to assume that industry-government entanglements have an inherent potential for abuse, they maximize their scrutiny of U.S. regulation in relation to that of other major economic powers**.** And by treating all compromises worked out within the GATT structure, but not memorialized in fully negotiated multilateral instruments, as nonbinding,they increase their capacity to alter the status quo in favor of expanding their own powers.

**Econ resilient—empirics**

**Zakaria, 9**—, PhD in pol sci Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, 12 December 2009, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html, AMiles)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world,was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.  Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."  Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.  Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.  One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaringdebt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.  A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstablecountries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but itdoes reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"  This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakesonce this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.  It's true that the massive stateinterventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.  Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.

**No impact to collapse—liberalism**

**Zakaria, 9**—, PhD in pol sci Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, 12 December 2009, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html, AMiles)

The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.  The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today.  Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold Warhad a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong.  This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, whilethe nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.  The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability.  Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity.Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system. Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world.  This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

**Disease inevitable—multiple global hotspots and always a risk of mutations—the aff doesn’t solve world wide—**

**No extinction**

**Posner, law prof, 5**—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html, AG)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.

**Intervening actors check**

**Zakaria, PhD from Harvard, 9—**Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935, AMiles)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristics that led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected, writers and officials bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.

### 1NC – Heg

#### Strategic petroleum reserve solves heg

Jaffe 13 Amy Myers Jaffe is executive director of energy and sustainability at University of California at Davis Graduate School of Management. She was formerly the director of the Energy Forum at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. “An Oil Boom Means Washington—Not Riyadh—Could Become the World's Swing Oil Producer” Wall Street Journal. March 27, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.html – clawan

For four decades, the geopolitical leverage achieved by large petro-exporting states has been a major challenge for the U.S. and its allies. Now, the rapid growth of oil and natural-gas production from unconventional shale resources in North America is rapidly eliminating this threat, with positive geopolitical implications for the U.S. As political uncertainty spreads across the Mideast, rising U.S. shale-oil production may become a more critical touchstone to market stability. In fact, the U.S. shale-oil boom might roll back the clock to the 1960s when a U.S. oil surplus (via the Texas Railroad Commission), put Washington, not Riyadh, as the world's swing producer. In a world where the U.S. will have few, if any, oil imports to replace during a global supply outage, Washington will have more discretion to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to help allies in times of crisis or to prevent oil producers from using energy cutoffs to achieve financial or geopolitical goals. U.S. oil and gas exports will also garner closer ties to allies and friendly countries through closer economic relations. A domestic oil and gas boom will also bring the US back to a stronger economic footing, possibly giving the country back some of the financial sway that previously allowed it to dominate international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank. U.S. foreign aid and even energy exports could become a stronger counterpoint to continuing Chinese global investment. Beijing might also find soon that its overt policies of aiding problem states like Iran and Syria and thereby tying up the U.S. in conflicts across the Middle East will become more and more counterproductive over time as rising energy costs hit oil-import dependent China harder than an energy self-sufficient America.

**No oil wars – empirics prove states’ calculations have changed**

**Fettweis 10** (Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, “Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace,” pg. 126)

If the cases above are any indication, no stage of this life cycle carries much risk of major war to control resources. In fact, the most obvious observation that emerges from the study of petropolitics is that at no time have great powers come close to loggerheads over control of these vital regions. No country has ever actively prepared to conquer these weak areas, nor has any felt it necessary to prepare to defend them. Consumer cooperation, rather than conflict, is **the rule**. There has never been a war to control territory that contains fossil fuels, and there are good reasons to believe it is likely that there never will be. The conventional wisdom concerning the inevitability of energy wars is probably **wrong**. Why has great power behavior failed to live up to pessimistic expectations? While it is hard to argue that democracy has helped confound the various ecopessimist projections, since not all interested parties are democracies, other rationalist explanations for stability cannot be entirely ruled out. Perhaps it is the **fear of escalation** toward a nuclear holocaust that has kept the great powers from fighting over oil. Perhaps liberal internationalists are correct and complex interdependence should be given primary credit. 'Whatever the initial cause the idea that war would be a viable option to control the most valuable regions in the world does not seem to have occurred to the great consumer nations. As time goes on, it becomes **more** and more **unlikely** that it ever will. Resources have historically been a primary motivator for war. The most valuable regions-those worthy of contestation and conquest-have always been those that were the richest. Today, **that calculation seems to have changed**, even regarding the most vulnerable, valuable regions in the world. It seems as if the states of the industrialized world have indeed taken Angell's ideas to heart and have reached the conclusion that oil is not worth fighting one another for. Perhaps, for the first time, nothing is.

**Oil dependence is key to US-Saudi relations**

Mouawad9 New York Times, “Saudi Blasts American Energy Policy”, <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/saudi-blasts-american-energy-policy/>

The question of American “energy independence” clearly rankles officials in Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest exporter of crude oil, who seem increasingly puzzled by the energy policy of the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer. In a short and strongly-worded essay in Foreign Policy magazine, Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to the United States and a nephew to King Abdullah, said that for American politicians, invoking energy independence “is now as essential as baby-kissing,” and accuses them of “demagoguery.” All the talk about energy independence, Mr. al-Faisal said, is “political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and consuming countries alike.” There is no technology on the horizon that can completely replace oil as the fuel for the United States’ massive manufacturing, transportation, and military needs; any future, no matter how wishful, will include a mix of renewable and nonrenewable fuels. Considering this, efforts spent proselytizing about energy independence should instead focus on acknowledging energy interdependence. Like it or not, the fates of the United States and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia date back to the 1930s when American geologists first struck oil in the kingdom. While American companies built the Saudi oil industry, Americans have never shaken off their suspicions and mistrust of the kingdom since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. It’s not the first time a Saudi official has criticized American energy policy, or its growing reliance on renewable fuels. Many of Prince Turki’s arguments recycle Saudi Arabia’s position that for the past 30 years, the oil-rich kingdom has acted in a responsible manner to keep oil markets well supplied. Prince Turki correctly points at the steps taken by Saudi Arabia in recent years to increase its production to make up for lost production in Iraq or elsewhere in times of crisis, and invest close to $100 billion in new capacity over the past five years. On the other hand, he points out that four countries — Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela — failed to live up to expectations that they would raise their production over the past decade for a variety of reasons, including “a U.S. invasion” in the case of Iraq. The Saudis have genuine reasons to fear the effects of the Obama administration’s energy policy and its commitment to reducing oil consumption, as well as efforts to reduce carbon emissions. As Prince Turki points out himself, Saudi Arabia holds 25 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and would like to keep selling oil for several more decades. As such, the Saudis know that any attempt to reduce gasoline consumption is a threat to the future of the Saudi economy. It’s an old refrain: in his most famous remark, the former Saudi oil minister, Sheik Yamani, once said that the stone age didn’t end because the world ran out of stones, and the oil age will not end because the world runs out of oil. It will end when something replaces it. The trend has already started. Oil demand in the United States has peaked — instead of rising as it has since the dawn of the age of oil more than a century ago, the nation’s oil consumption has begun its long decline. The question is: how fast will the transition take?

Relations are key to stabilizing Iran and Pakistan

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Besides, Saudi Arabia isn't just a giant gas station with a flag. Saudi help is now essential for numerous top-shelf U.S. priorities, from containing Iran to countering terrorism to extricating U.S. troops from Afghanistan and keeping Pakistan stable. **Only Saudi Arabia**, with its carefully cultivated, behind-the-scenes links to countries and leaders who do not trust Washington, can play this role.

That goes nuclear – turns case

Morgan 10 **–**Labour Party Executive Committee, political writer, author of "The Mind of a Terrorist Fundamentalist - the Cult of Al Qaeda" (Stephen, “Better Another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR,” 6/4, http://society.ezinemark.com/better-another-taliban-afghanistan-than-a-taliban-nuclear-pakistan-4d0ce18ba75.html)

The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

**No impact to heg—free riding, threat exaggeration, overstretch, anti-americanism—regional powers fill in**

**Maher 11—PhD candidate in Political Science @ Brown**

Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2011 Orbis, ScienceDirect

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president—who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests—the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, **overestimate** the intensity and immediacy of **threats**, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is **beyond the pale** even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008— the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The **only way** to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically **decreases its share**. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen—and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

### 1NC – Solvency

#### Argentina fills in and solves

NNAM 9/5 (National News Agency of Malaysia, BERMANA-NNN-MERCOPRESS, September 5, 2013, “Argentina's YPF May Join Mexico's Pemex Oil To Develop Shale Oil Resources,” <http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v7/wn/newsworld.php?id=975357>, alp)

Argentine energy company YPF Chief Executive Officer Miguel Galuccio said the company is willing to form a partnership with Mexico s state-run Petroleos Mexicanos to develop shale oil and natural gas deposits in the Vaca Muerta formation. "YPF is open to generate all the agreements needed to put in production the huge resources from Vaca Muerta and Pemex could be a good partner," Galuccio said. After YPF sealed its first shale accord with Chevron Corp. on July 16, Galuccio said Argentina needs more partners like the California-based company to stop a production decline that contributed this year to the biggest plunge in central bank reserves since 2002. Energy imports, which doubled to 9.4 billion dollars in 2011 from a year earlier, rose to 10.5 billion in 2012 and are forecast by ex-Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna to climb to 15 billion this year. "In order to develop reserves we need investments from partners to revert the natural decline of fields," Galuccio said, adding that the development of shale gas and oil requires a huge amount of cash and the sharing of risks and expertise. In April 2012, Argentina s President Cristina Fernandez seized majority control of YPF from Spain s Repsol SA. Mexico City-based Pemex is a minority shareholder in Repsol. Galuccio admitted having had "many business meetings in the last few months" with Pemex s CEO Emilio Lozoya. Argentina, which holds one of the world s largest shale gas and oil reserves according to US Energy Information Administration data, is offering tax and export incentives for energy companies that invest at least 1 billion dollars over a five-year period.

#### No solvency – can’t attract investment

Booth and Miroff 5/7(William, Nick, 5/7/13, “To power Mexico forward, Peña Nieto looks to energy reform,” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-07/world/39073749_1_energy-industry-foreign-oil-petroleos-de-mexico>, alp)

Lifting the restrictions on foreign oil companies through a constitutional amendment would require a two-thirds majority in Mexico’s Congress and the endorsement of more than half of the country’s state governors. Peña Nieto is expected to face considerable political wrangling from the powerful oil workers union, left-leaning lawmakers and interest groups, which are content with their slice of the status quo, even as overall production has slipped. Analysts say that unless Mexico can offer foreign drillers a share of the crude, rather than the fee-per-service contracts that Pemex offers, the country will have a hard time attracting the capital and expertise it needs. Because multinational oil companies raise money from investors based on the estimated amount of oil they own the rights to, and Mexico’s prevailing model affords them no ability to claim, or “book,” reserves, there’s little incentive to drill there. Then there is the problem of Pemex’s creaky infrastructure and poor safety record, underscored by a Jan. 31 explosion caused by a gas leak at the company’s Mexico City headquarters that killed 38 people and injured 120. Ownership concerns. Mexico’s three major political parties have signed a broadly written “Pact for Mexico,” whose ­energy-related provisions concur that all hydrocarbons should remain state-controlled and that Pemex needs to be a competitive, modern and profitable company with ramped-up production.

# 2NC

## Heg

### 2NC – Overview

**energy independence crushes the Saudi alliance –perceived as political posturing and demagoguery which results in mistrust –causes a short-term collapse in the Saudi economy which spurs anti-Americanism and regional backlash which makes relations unsustainable**

**that prevents us from stabilizing Pakistan – Saudi policy tools uniquely key – that’s levine**

**3) Extend Morgan – the impact is escalatory nuclear tensions – al qaeda accesses pakistan’s arsenal and sells it – causes attacks on Israel – outweighs**

* **Magnitude: nuclear strikes on Israel result in the Sampson option which releases all Israel’s nukes and triggers global escalation – outweighs and draws in all nuclear powers**

**Case can’t solve – our impact is Pakistan state collapse and not india war – status quo heg declining and trade deficit increasing prove no war now because of oil dependence**

### 2NC – Heg DA

#### Turns heg

Drezner 8 — professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Daniel, 30 November-December 2008, “Oil Dependence As Virtue,” The National Interest, CMR)

Let's say that conservation, substitution and recession cause a slide in the price of oil. This has already happened to some extent; after hitting $140 a barrel, as of mid-October, the price dipped below $70 a barrel. Now let's say that this trend continues: within a few years, a mix of greater exploration, greater conservation and the development of alternative energy sources causes the price of oil to fall even further, to $50.¶ Despite this drop, assume the memory of $140 oil looms sufficiently large in the minds of Western and Chinese consumers, so prevailing fears about energy security, combined with elevated concerns about global warming, spur investments in radical energy-saving innovations in transport and electricity generation. These innovations then allow many developing economies to "leapfrog" the pollution-intensive phase of economic development, further lessening demand for oil. The price of all hydrocarbon-based sources of energy plummets, as environmentally friendly alternatives replace oil and natural gas almost everywhere.¶ By the end of the next decade, then, we would be living in a world where oil prices had dropped in real terms to levels not seen since before the 1973 oil shock. In this alternative future, the only place Americans would see a combustion engine is on the "NASCAR classic" circuit.¶ If this scenario actually came to pass, optimists might anticipate being able to rejoice at a return to the end of history, while pessimists might fear that the oil-exporting states would descend into anarchy.¶ But, to imagine one way in which this scenario could play out, let's fast-forward to 2025. What actually happened in the world after oil turned out to be something entirely unexpected.¶ The Year is 2025¶ Beijing is the most authoritative voice in the international arena. Unencumbered by the resource curse, the Middle East is at long last stable, once-fragile African countries are active participants in the global economy and authoritarian regimes suffer from their inability to adapt while nuclear weapons proliferate.¶ [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]¶ The United States, meanwhile, enjoys only second-tier-power status.¶ Contrary to the most dire predictions, the end of the oil era did not destroy the Persian Gulf states. Instead of becoming the sand dunes of desperation the West expected, the Gulf states put money into education and infrastructure, and loosened their religious constraints. While the West assumed the Persian Gulf contained brittle and feckless sheikhdoms, in reality these governments proved resilient and adaptive.¶ That is because at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the GCC regimes had sufficient institutional memory to recall the previous oil bust of the late eighties and early nineties. Unlike in past booms, they did not permit consumption to rise at the same rate as their trade surpluses; the governments of the Gulf spent less than 45 percent of their oil revenue in 2008. The excess revenue filled the coffers of the region's sovereign wealth funds and central banks. And so, by 2010 the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority was sitting on close to $1 trillion in assets. These funds were large enough for the GCC economies to use the interest income without drawing down on the principal of the funds in order to invest in the non-oil aspects of their economy.¶ These changes had less to do with the character of the regimes than the fact that they moved up the learning curve. Back in the 1970s, most oil exporters did one of three things with their bulging coffers: they passively recycled their petrodollars through American banks; dramatically expanded their welfare states and increased consumption of luxury goods; or invested in ill-conceived white-elephant industries in their home countries. None of these strategies worked terribly well. The subsequent downturn in the oil market in the 1980s led cash-strapped GCC regimes into politically sensitive budget cuts and increased borrowing. Despite predictions that the sheikhdoms would collapse, they were able to retrench and survive the lean years.¶ So this time, these states saved enough during the oil spike of 2008 to maintain their standard of living even after petroleum ceased to be a strategic commodity. Governments across the region began by investing in the basic infrastructures necessary for a diversified, modern economy. Qatar was already spending more than $1.5 billion a year on research and development. Saudi Arabia commissioned six "knowledge cities," at a cost of more than $100 billion, for construction in the kingdom's less developed regions. And they ploughed significant sums--S20 billion by 2008--into their educational infrastructure.¶ The emirate of Dubai took it a step further, leading the way toward sustained economic growth in the post-oil era. During the final oil boom, it was the hub of nonpetroleum business activity. The $10 billion foundation the emirate established to fund higher education in the region was just the beginning. Since Dubai anticipated running out of oil by 2020 anyway, it took the lead in remaking itself as a financial and transport hub in the global economy. It liberalized its markets and began to tolerate a much more cosmopolitan lifestyle than the rest of the Middle East.¶ Out of desperation and jealousy, the other emirates of the UAE adopted similar strategies and policies. Abu Dhabi created new SWFS like Mubadala for the express purpose of partnering with Western multinational corporations, like General Electric. In exchange for acquiring stakes in these firms, the Western companies agreed to invest in Abu Dhabi. With depressed markets elsewhere, they were eager to establish a toehold in the Middle East.¶ The rest of the Gulf governments took notice of the success of their more cosmopolitan neighbor. Thus they were able to make a fairly smooth transition to ordinary, non-resource-based economies by following the Dubai model. With ballooning numbers of young people entering the workforce, anything that promoted job creation was deemed consistent with the Koran as a way to achieve sustainable non-oil development. The Saudi regime protected itself from clerical criticism by offsetting its new liberalized visa regime with the innovation of a two-hundred-mile "zone of Islam" around the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina. This grand compromise allowed the GCC states to take more radical steps, such as recognizing Israel, without losing the support of conservative clerics.¶ All this has left a region filled with economic prosperity, more open societies and decreased extremism. The Gulf states are liberalized, but not completely democratized. Though not all of these states have made the transition with the same success as Dubai, the GCC states have integrated their economies to the point where they share a common currency and a common external tariff. The combination of enhanced security and an economic union created a rising tide lifting all the sheikhdoms.¶ [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]¶ Though poorer energy-exporting states were initially hit hard by plummeting oil prices, as it turned out they have also faired well. The first stages were difficult because most of these countries were unstable or failing regimes that lacked diversified economies. States like Nigeria, with nondemocratic and weak governments unable to force change, stripped of oil rents, had only a few years to adjust to a much harsher economic environment. This time political scientists and economists were proven right. Exactly what was expected to happen did in fact come to pass: the end of oil for these governments meant the end of several bloody and divisive conflicts, and these states became more stable and prosperous.¶ During the oil era, theory held that despite the apparent boost in revenues, an economy dependent on the export of natural resources like diamonds or oil suffered from a "resource curse." Oil revenues brought a host of negative effects, civil war being the most obvious. (1)¶ The reasoning behind this relationship was assumed to be straightforward. The more wealth controlled by the state, the more incentive for political groups to wrest control of it by any means necessary. At the same time, oil wealth would increase the likelihood of a "rentier state"--one that is disconnected from its citizens because it does not need to rely on them for resources. Rentier states are therefore more vulnerable to external and internal challenges to their authority.¶ After the first OPEC oil shock in 1973, the likelihood of a petroleum-rich state being involved in a conflict more than tripled. Long-standing disputes in Colombia, Nigeria, Sudan and Indonesia were linked to or exacerbated by conflicts over the distribution of oil wealth. Theorists saw a tight correlation between a country having an oil-rich economy and being enmeshed in civil war. Disputes over the distribution of oil revenues helped to extend the civil war in post-2003 Iraq. Five years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, different ethnic groups were still battling over the final administrative status of oil-rich Kirkuk.¶ Without oil, many economists and political scientists predicted that these smaller, resource-dependent states would be free of the "resource curse." Nigeria, Iraq, Angola and Sudan would see an end to resource-driven conflicts and become more stable.¶ And for many states, these assumptions about a post-oil era held. The removal of internal and external oil did contribute to the end of long-standing conflicts. Shockingly enough, the end of the oil era meant that Iraqi ethnic groups cared a lot less about who administered Kirkuk. Across the globe, fears of resource wars in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia disappeared. Fragmented states like these became less divided and more representative.¶ Granted, the effects of declining oil prices weren't all magical. In some of these war-torn societies, like Sudan, the bitterness and blood feuds have a self-sustaining momentum, propelling continued fighting even after the main catalyst disappears.¶ And truly, not all of the oil-dependent governments were as fortunate as the GCC. For the middle-income states--like Russia, Venezuela and Iran--the end of the oil age turned out to be a disaster. These regimes once had leveraged their oil revenues to increase their power. With only empty coffers and domestic chaos left after the oil crash, however, nuclear states ended up launching diversionary wars and nonnuclear governments built atomic weapons in the hopes of regaining some semblance of control, all in the vain hope of bolstering domestic support and cohesion. Yet, everyone predicted that without oil, these autocratic oil-exporting behemoths would disintegrate because of domestic instability and spending sprees, and that's exactly what happened.¶ Populist leaders like Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded to the oil boom by dramatically increasing government expenditures. For instance, state-owned firms in Russia, with the expectation of sustained oil revenues, went on a borrowing spree. These types of actions bought popular support for the regimes, but the collapse of oil prices left them abjectly unprepared to sustain those expenditures. Like the GCC economies, many of these countries had official reserves and sovereign wealth funds. But their reserves were much smaller than the Gulf states--within a year or two after the end of oil these governments spent most of their principal. It did not help that some of these reserve funds had been raided before the oil boom even ended. Iran's Oil Stabilization Fund, for example, was quickly depleted because Ahmadinejad and his political allies proved unable to stop themselves from draining it for domestic spending programs during the boom years. Hugo Chavez did the same thing with the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). When the financial storm came, these rainy-day coffers were bone dry.¶ And then these states got desperate. They faced rising levels of domestic unpopularity and great powers eager to see them toppled. They undertook two types of actions in response to their predicament. Some countries launched diversionary wars in an effort to rally disaffected citizens around the flag. Azerbaijan revived its simmering dispute with Armenia, and Libya intervened in Chad--again. Ecuador announced an "alliance" with the last fragments of Colombia's FARC rebels, while Russia attempted to annex the Russian-speaking provinces in Kazakhstan.¶ Each of these moves led to short-term increases in support for the regime. But none of them successfully prolonged their leaders' grip on power. After all, diversionary wars have never been a terribly successful tactic to hold power over the long term. After the initial euphoria, discontent with the notion of a prolonged war led to coups d'etat in each of these countries. Russia was hardest hit. Domestic instability following its Kazakh misadventure deepened the political and social malaise triggered by its demographic decline. In the ultimate sign of its weakness, Moscow essentially outsourced the mineral resources of Siberia to China.¶ Other post-oil regimes tried to ensure their longevity by developing nuclear weapons. Typically, nuclear programs serve multiple purposes. They can be a credible deterrent against aggression by external actors. Internally, the announcement of joining the nuclear club can swell national pride in countries that already have strong nationalist sentiments--i.e., Iran and Venezuela.¶ By the time the nationalist rapture in response to their nuclear programs wore off, the regimes were convinced that they had cemented their hold on power. But in Venezuela this was not the case. Regional outrage at the government's nuclear announcement--led by former near-nuclear states Brazil and Argentina--undermined Venezuela's international support, and Chavez did not survive. In the end, South America remained a nuclear-flee zone of democratic countries.

### 2NC – Russia DA

#### We solve all multilat and make global stability more effective – dependence key

Howard 8 (Roger, writer and broadcaster specializing in international relations, published author, “An Ode to Oil”, Nov 29, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html>, CMR)

Alarming as these scenarios are, they disguise the true picture, one that is really much more complicated and much more reassuring. While there are, of course, circumstances in which oil can exacerbate tensions and be a source of conflict, it can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability. So to identify America's "foreign oil dependency" as a source of vulnerability and weakness is just too neat and easy.¶ This identification wholly ignores the dependency of foreign oil producers on their consumers, above all on the world's largest single market -- the United States. Despite efforts to diversify their economies, all of the world's key exporters are highly dependent on oil's proceeds and have always lived in fear of the moment that has now become real -- when global demand slackens and prices fall. The recent, dramatic fall in price per barrel -- now standing at around $54, less than four months after peaking at $147 -- perfectly exemplifies the producers' predicament.¶ So even if such a move were possible in today's global market, no oil exporter is ever in a position to alienate its customers. Supposed threats of embargoes ring hollow because no producer can assume that its own economy will be damaged any less than that of any importing country. What's more, a supply disruption would always seriously damp global demand. Even in the best of times, a prolonged price spike could easily tip the world into economic recession, prompt consumers to shake off their gasoline dependency, or accelerate a scientific drive to find alternative fuels. Fearful of this "demand destruction" when crude prices soared so spectacularly in the summer, the Saudis pledged to pump their wells at full tilt. It seems that their worst fears were realized: Americans drove 9.6 billion fewer miles in July this year compared with last, according to the Department of Transportation.¶ Instead, the dependency of foreign oil producers on their customers plays straight into America's strategic hands. Washington is conceivably in a position to hold producers to ransom by threatening to accelerate a drive to develop or implement alternative fuels, realizing the warning once uttered by Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the former Saudi oil minister who pointed out that "the Stone Age did not end for lack of stone." Back in 1973, as they protested at Washington's stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Middle East producers were in a position to impose an oil embargo on the Western world. But a generation later, technological advances, and the strength of public and scientific concern about global warming, have turned the tables.¶ The United States has powerful political leverage over producers because it holds the key to future oil supply as well as market demand. The age of "easy oil" is over, and as fears grow that oil is becoming harder to get, so too will the dependency of producers on increasingly sophisticated Western technology and expertise.¶ Such skills will be particularly important in two key areas of oil production. One is finding and extracting offshore deposits, like the massive reserves reckoned to be under the Caspian and Arctic seas, or in Brazil's recently discovered Tupi field. The other is prolonging the lifespan of declining wells through enhanced "tertiary" recovery. Because Western companies have a clear technological edge over their global competitors in these hugely demanding areas, Washington exerts some powerful political leverage over exporters, many of whom openly anticipate the moment when their production peaks before gradually starting to decline.¶ Syria illustrates how this leverage can work. Although oil has been the primary source of national income for more than 40 years, production has recently waned dramatically: Output is now nearly half of the peak it reached in the mid-1990s, when a daily output of 600,000 barrels made up 60% of gross domestic product, and can barely sustain rapidly growing domestic demand fueled by a very high rate of population growth. With enough foreign investment Syrian oil could be much more productive and enduring, but Washington has sent foreign companies, as well as American firms, a tough message to steer well clear. It is not surprising, then, that the Damascus regime regards a rapprochement with the U.S. as a political lifeline and in recent months has shown signs of a new willingness to compromise.¶ The same predicament confronted Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi, who first offered to surrender weapons of mass destruction during secret negotiations with U.S. officials in May 1999. Facing a deepening economic crisis that he could not resolve without increasing the production of his main export, oil, Col. Gadhafi was prepared to bow to Washington's demands and eventually struck a path-breaking accord in December 2003. Col. Gadhafi had been the "Mad Dog" of the Reagan years, but oil's influence had initiated what President Bush hailed as "the process of rejoining the community of nations."¶ Oil could also help the outside world frustrate the nuclear ambitions of Iran, whose output is likely to steadily decline over the coming years unless it has access to the latest Western technology. Many wells are aging rapidly and the Iranians cannot improve recovery rates, or exploit their new discoveries, unless Washington lifts sanctions, which have been highly successful in deterring international investment.¶ Sometimes the markets will prove at least as effective as any American sanctions in keeping a tight political rein on oil producers. For example, when Russian forces attacked South Ossetia and Georgia on Aug. 8, Russia's stock market -- of which energy stocks comprise 60% -- plunged by nearly 7%, and within a week capital outflow reached a massive $16 billion, suddenly squeezing domestic credit while the ruble collapsed in value. A month later, the country was facing its worst crisis since the default of August 1998. But the future of the oil sector is so dependent on attracting massive foreign investment, and the wider Russian economy so heavily dependent on petrodollars, that the Kremlin simply can't afford to unnecessarily unnerve investors.¶ Today the markets know that Russia needs at least $1 trillion in investment if it is to maintain, let alone increase, its oil production. Just five years ago, output was increasing so fast -- energy giants Yukos and Sibneft were posting annual production gains of 20% -- that even the Saudis were worried about their own global dominance. But in the past year Russian oil production has started to wane. Leonid Fedun, a top official at Lukoil, Russia's No. 2 oil producer, admitted back in April that national output had peaked and was unlikely to return to 2007 levels "in my lifetime" and that "the period of intense oil production [growth] is over." Without foreign money and expertise to extract offshore oil and prolong the lifespan of existing wells, Russian production will fall dramatically.¶ Russia's oil, in other words, acted as peacemaker. This seems paradoxical for it has sometimes been said that the Kremlin's attack on South Ossetia and Georgia was prompted by an ambition to seize control of local pipelines. But although this was an aggravating factor, it was not the primary cause because Russian leaders would have felt threatened -- reasonably or not -- by the presence of NATO in what they regard as their own backyard even if the region was not an energy hub. They were also reportedly eyeing Ukraine, which has no petroleum deposits of its own and poses no threat to the dominance of their giant energy company, Gazprom.¶ Oil can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability because many conflicts, in almost every part of the world, can threaten a disruption of supply and instantly send crude prices spiraling. Despite the recent price falls, the market is still vulnerable to sudden supply shocks, and a sharp increase would massively affect the wider global economy. This would have potentially disastrous social and political results, just as in the summer many countries, including France, Nepal and Indonesia, were rocked by violent protests at dramatic price increases in gasoline.¶ Haunted by the specter of higher oil prices at a time of such economic fragility, many governments have a very strong incentive to use diplomacy, not force, to resolve their own disputes, and to help heal other people's. This is true not just of oil consumers but producers, which would also be keen not to watch global demand stifled by such price spikes.¶ Consider the events of last fall, when the Ankara government was set to retaliate against the Iraq-based Kurdish guerrillas who had killed 17 Turkish soldiers and taken others prisoner in a cross-border raid on Oct. 21, 2007. Even the mere prospect of such an attack sent the price of a barrel surging to a then record high of $85 because the markets knew that the insurgents could respond by damaging a key pipeline which moves 750,000 barrels of oil across Turkish territory every day.¶ Not surprisingly, the Bush administration pushed very hard to prevent a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq -- State Department spokesman Sean McCormack aptly described the frenzy of diplomatic activity as a "full-court press" -- not just to avoid shattering the vestiges of Iraq's political structure but also to stabilize oil prices. In the end it was American pressure that averted a major incursion, allowing crude prices to quickly ease. And the Turks would also have been aware that any invasion could have prompted retaliatory damage on the oil pipeline, losing them vast transit fees.¶ In general, oil is such a vital commodity, for consumers, producers and intermediaries alike, that it represents a meeting point for all manner of different interests. Sometimes it offers an opportunity for competitors and rivals to resolve differences, as in March 1995, when Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to break deadlock with Washington by offering a technically very demanding oil contract to Conoco. Today, the symbiotic energy requirements of Europe and Russia allows scope to improve mutual relations, not least if European governments act in unison to impose the rules of the European Union's energy charter on Moscow. Oil also gives consumers a chance to penalize, or tempt, international miscreants, just as U.S. sanctions are forcing the Tehran regime to reassess its cost-benefit analysis of building the bomb.¶ What cannot go unchallenged is a facile equation between oil on the one hand, and war, bloodshed and, in America's particular case, strategic vulnerability on the other. For oil, fortunately, can often be our guardian.

### 2NC – Terror DA

**Oil dependence solves state-sponsored terrorism and Middle East war**

**Miller 10** — assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma (Gregory D., April 2010, © Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 33:2, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr\_Miller.pdf, CMR)

A drop in demand for oil would lead to increased probability of conflict between current oil exporters and their customers, including developed Western states, as well as between oil producers and their neighbors. This risk will be especially pronounced **in regions with a high number of oil-exporting states such as the Middle East.** According to the concept of interdependence, the likelihood of states going to war with each other decreases as mutual dependence between them increases, with trade being the most common measure of interdependence. This idea was reflected in the Clinton administration policy of increasing trade with China in the 1990s. Early European integration in the 1950s was similarly designed to prevent a future European war.3 If valid, then the inverse of the theory suggests that as states reduce their demand for foreign oil, **levels of interdependence between consumer states and oil exporters will fall, increasing the likelihood of conflict.** Although it is unlikely that war would occur simply because of lower trade levels, the logic of interdependence theory is that the wealth gained from trade restrains policymakers who otherwise might engage in conflict.4 If the United States is no longer dependent on foreign oil and if oil-exporting states no longer gain revenue from the United States, **there would be fewer constraints on each state’s willingness to use violence**, whether it be in the form of conventional military force or state sponsorship of terrorism.

**The impact is escalatory nuclear terrorism and extinction**

Morgan 9 (Dennis Ray Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies at the Yongin Campus in South Korea, 2009, Futures, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race, CMR)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.

### 2NC – AT: Oil not key

**US Middle East policies have strained relations now – new tensions will definitely escalate**

**AP 8/13** (“Mideast upheavals open doors for Saudi strategies,” Lexis)

Stronger Saudi policies open the risks of friction with Washington, which is Saudi Arabia's main arms supplier and had counted on Saudi support to push U.S. interests in the Arab world. There is virtually no chance of a serious rift, and U.S. and Saudi officials are on the same page on other pivotal showdowns, such as efforts to get Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down after months of protest and bloodshed. Saleh is recovering in Saudi Arabia after being badly injured in a June attack on his palace compound. But even small rough patches between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia take on heightened significance in the tense Mideast climate. The Saudi statement on Syria followed White House urging for the Saudis and their Arab allies to take a sharper stance on Assad's government. Days later, the U.S. imposed new sanctions on Syria, and presidential spokesman Jay Carney said Thursday that Syria "would be a much better place" without Assad in charge. In March, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Bahrain was on the "wrong track" to allow Saudi-led forces to help crush protests in the island kingdom which is home to the Pentagon's main military force in the region, the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet. Rights groups also have called on U.S. officials to take a sharper stance against Saudi Arabia's crackdowns on internal dissent, including a proposed law that Amnesty International said would allow authorities to prosecute peaceful protests as a terrorist act. In Iraq, Saudi officials are deeply wary of the U.S.-backed government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite who owes his power to Iranian-allied political groups. Meanwhile, a higher regional profile invites uncomfortable scrutiny about Saudi royal succession with both King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan in their mid-80s and undergoing medical treatment this year. Christopher Boucek, who follows Mideast security issues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes Saudi leaders view U.S. policymakers as more preoccupied with "being on the right side of history instead of standing by its friends." "Increasingly, it seems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign policy interests do not overlap with the United States and Washington's security interests," Boucek said. "Saudi Arabia is now in a position to pursue its own interests."

#### It’s key

House 12

(not oft-disgruntled House, M.D., but Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Karen Elliott House. Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles – November 30, 2012 – lexis)

QUESTION: Warren Hoge[28], International Peace Institute.¶ Karen, there's a lot of talk in American politics about the desire to become energy independent, no longer dependent upon countries like Saudi Arabia, and there's a real possibility that could happen. The numbers are there, fracking and offshore oil, that sort of thing. Suppose that does happen. How would that affect our relationship with Saudi Arabia, and is this something the Saudis themselves worry about?¶ KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: I don't think they like it when we talk about energy independence. They do take that as a personal insult. I think it would loosen somewhat our sense of dependence. But the global economy is still going to be not we so much; I mean we're not a major importer of Saudi oil now but the global economy is a major importer of Saudi oil and will continue to be.¶ There are a lot of people, like John Deutch[29], who is a very smart man and certainly knows energy, who believes that it doesn't matter who runs Saudi Arabia, they will export oil. And they obviously will export some. But if you assume that if anything happened to take the royal family out of the picture, the only other organized structure because nothing is allowed to organize, no book clubs, no photography clubs, no soccer leagues other than the one the government runs is the religious organization. There are 70,000 mosques all over the country. That's basically one for every 150 men. So that's the most organized group.

### 2NC – AT: Domestic fill in

**US-Saudi ties are high – dependence is key**

**International Oil Daily 4** (staff, November 5, 2004, LN)

Saudi Arabian oil supply is expected to remain at the heart of US energy policy following the compelling election win by President George W. Bush, according to analysts polled by International Oil Daily. "Bush is more inclined to US dependence on Middle Eastern oil than Kerry would have been," said Muhammad-Ali Zainy, analyst at the Center for Global Energy Studies in London, adding that he sees the US-Saudi relationship remaining strong. "It isn't the Bush/Al-Saud relationship that promotes the oil relationship, the US dependence on Saudi oil is a historical fact which is inescapable," said Zainy. "The priorities in relation to Saudi Arabia will remain the same, that of oil and stability, and both are interlinked," said Mai Yamani, a Saudi expert at London's Royal Institute for International Affairs. "The most important issue for the US is to keep the oil tap open," she added. Even if Bush succeeds with proposals to promote domestic production, by opening Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for example, this will not change its need for Saudi oil, commented Zainy. "Assuming Congress will approve this [ANWR exploration ], this has an inherently long lead time from initial exploration to bringing any oil on the markets," he said. "In any case any new production will only offset declines elsewhere." Despite declines earlier, prompting talk of a possible shift in Saudi policy, the kingdom has recently returned to the top of the US' crude oil import rankings. In August, Saudi Arabia was by far the largest crude oil supplier to the US at 1.821 million barrels per day, and also landed 110,000 b/d of products (IOD Oct.20,p4). Saudi Arabia has held the top spot every year since 1998.

**And we’re increasing reliance now – domestic sources are insufficient or otherwise inhibited**

**Krauss 8/16** (Clifford, New York Times, August 16, 2012, “U.S. Reliance on Oil From Saudi Arabia Is Growing Again,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/business/energy-environment/us-reliance-on-saudi-oil-is-growing-again.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, alp)

HOUSTON — The United States is increasing its dependence on oil from Saudi Arabia, raising its imports from the kingdom by more than 20 percent this year, even as fears of military conflict in the tinderbox Persian Gulf region grow. The increase in Saudi oil exports to the United States began slowly last summer and has picked up pace this year. Until then, the United States had decreased its dependence on foreign oil and from the Gulf in particular. This reversal is driven in part by the battle over Iran’s nuclear program. The United States tightened sanctions that hampered Iran’s ability to sell crude, the lifeline of its troubled economy, and Saudi Arabia agreed to increase production to help guarantee that the price did not skyrocket. While prices have remained relatively stable, and Tehran’s treasury has been squeezed, the United States is left increasingly vulnerable to a region in turmoil. The jump in Saudi oil production has been welcomed by Washington and European governments, but Saudi society faces its own challenges, with the recent deaths of senior members of the royal family and sectarian strife in the eastern part of the country, making the stability of Saudi energy and political policies uncertain. The United States has had a political alliance with the Saudi leadership that has lasted for decades, one that has become even more pivotal to Washington during the turmoil of the Arab spring and rising hostilities with Iran over that nation’s nuclear program. (Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter regional rivals.) The development underscores how difficult it is for the United States to lower its dependence on foreign oil — especially the heavy grades of crude that Saudi Arabia exports — even as domestic oil production is soaring. It is a development that has alarmed conservative and liberal foreign policy experts alike, especially with oil prices and Mideast tensions rising in recent weeks. In the United States, several oil refining companies have found it necessary to buy more crude from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to make up for declining production from Mexico and Venezuela, insufficient pipeline connections between the United States and Canadian oil sands fields, and the fallout from the 2010 BP disaster, which led to a yearlong drilling moratorium in the Gulf of Mexico. The United States imported a daily average of more than 1.45 million barrels of Saudi crude over the first five months of this year, compared to a daily average of roughly 1.15 million barrels over the same period last year, according to Energy Department estimates. Similar increases have come from Kuwait and Iraq, even while total OPEC and non-OPEC imports declined. The United States has imported little Iranian oil in recent years. Instead, because of the yearlong halt on new drilling, production is about 700,000 barrels a day lower than forecast. Much of that oil is heavy and is being replaced by Saudi imports, experts said.

### 2NC – AT: Dependence I/L

#### No internal link to dependence and no impact – that’s Jaffe – SPR solves dependence and makes purchase cutoff a foreign policy tool – better for heg because we control other countries’ economies:

#### At worst – they get an 11% magnitude internal link

Green 7/12 (Miranda Green, 7/12/13; Reporter for The Daily Beast; Increasing Oil Production in the U.S. Sparks Less OPEC Reliance; http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/12/increasing-oil-production-in-the-u-s-sparks-less-opec-reliance.html)

The U.S. is often painted as an energy-strapped nation reliant on foreign countries for most of its oil use. But that picture is changing as the country gets closer to complete energy independence. A report issued this week shows that the U.S. is increasingly producing more crude oil inside of its borders. Production jumped last week to its highest level since January 1992, according to a recent report by the Energy Information Administration. In the week ended July 5, the U.S. produced 7.4 million barrels per day, up 1.8 percent from the previous week, and the highest weekly level in more than 20 years. The increase is largely attributed to more drilling and the sharp rise of hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. The controversial technique of fracturing, or fracking, involves drilling into rock formations to release oil embedded in shale. Many of the U.S. reserves of crude oil are found in the Midwest and along the plains region. Two of the largest reserves are the Bakken and Eagle Ford oilfields located in North Dakota and Texas, respectively. The increase of oil production in the U.S. is reversely driving down the amount of foreign oil the country is importing from OPEC countries because the fuel is less needed. Meanwhile, the U.S. is reducing its use of oil—thanks to more efficient vehicles, less driving, the use of natural gas as a transport fuel, and greater investments in renewable energy. Total liquid fuel consumption in the U.S. declined by 2.1 percent in 2012, according to the EIA, and is expected to rise by less than 1 percent in 2013. And that means the U.S. needs to import less oil—especially from OPEC countires. Numbers from the EIA report show that only 11 percent of the oil the U.S. used in March came from sources outside the U.S.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony

#### No impact to hegemony:

#### 1) Empirics – signals go neg – sequestration, drawdown in Afghanistan, and Chinese modernization make US hard power less effective – soft power and diplomacy are a backstop to conflict – the WTO and the UN fill in for unilateralism – that’s Maher.

#### 2) Causality – every statistic and causal relationship goes neg

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### 3) Uniqueness – the Navy’s transitioning now – sufficient to solve hard power if you win it’s good

Alan Yu, story from Chicago Public Media, June 28, 2013. Boeing, United, USDA and Navy hope to power Midwest flights with biofuels, <http://www.wbez.org/boeing-united-usda-and-navy-hope-power-midwest-flights-biofuels-107900>

At a summit to announce the report’s findings, representatives from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Navy joined their civilian counterparts in declaring biofuels as the way forward for air travel.¶ For example, the Navy used a 50/50 biofuel blend to power its Great Green Fleet, a carrier strike group that includes the U.S.S. Nimitz, in the world’s largest maritime exercise last summer, says Tom Hicks, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy. Hicks said that the Navy often takes the lead with adopting new technology, citing titanium and nuclear power as examples. He said civilians often follow their lead.¶ “As you look back over the history of the Navy, the history of the defense department, when we get involved in different technologies, those absolutely have commercial impact,” Hicks said. “And (aviation biofuels) is something that we see going forward, as these fuels can be entered into the commercial market and be cost competitive, that this will just part of the new normal for the Navy in the future.”

#### That solves all conflicts

Friedman 7

(George, Stratfor, April)

There are times when the Navy's use is tactical, and times when it is strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power is highly strategic. The domination of the world's oceans represents the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy. It allows the United States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S. maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national security.

## Relations

### 2NC – Relations high/resilient

#### Relations with Mexico high and resilient:

#### a) Economic cooperation– migration, export-import relationships, FDI, and production sharing solve – that’s Wilson.

#### b) Compartmentalization –police symmetry ensure drug coop even if there are tensions elsewhere.

#### c) Framing – our ev’s predictive and empirical – no spillover between climate coop and fighting instability – that’s Selee.

#### Multiple reasons relations are inevitable:

#### 1) NAFTA bloc – prefer concrete policies over fearmongering

Shifter 13 (Michael, Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue, “A More Ambitious Agenda” February 2013 <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf\\CLans>)

Mexico and the United States have forged one of the strongest and most productive relationships in the world. No two countries anywhere engage so intensely on a daily basis, cooperate across such a wide and varied spectrum of issues, and affect the economy and society of the other so profoundly. No two sovereign nations are more demographically and economically integrated. With annual cross-border commerce of some $500 billion, Mexico is now the United States’ second largest trading partner. Some analysts project that it will overtake Canada for the No. 1 position within the decade. Sales to Mexico make up twothirds of all US exports to Latin America. Mexico, in turn, sends 80 percent of its exports to the United States and purchases nearly 60 percent of its imports from its northern neighbor. Substantial investment, too, flows in both directions. US investments in Mexico have averaged $12 billion annually for the past dozen years, amounting to more than half of all foreign investment in the country, according to the US State Department. In addition, families in the United States send more than $20 billion in remittances to Mexico each year. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which joined the economies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada in 1994, is today the world’s largest economic bloc, exceeding, albeit by a small margin, the total output of the 27-member European Union. Demography also matters. Some 33 million US residents are of Mexican origin. They make up more than 10 percent of the US population, nearly two-thirds of all Latinos, and around 7 percent of American voters. While US political debates tend to spotlight unauthorized immigration, 80 percent of Mexicans in the United States are legal residents. Still, illegal immigration may be the single most troubling issue in US-Mexico relations, although changing migration patterns and the growing influence of Latino voters may offer solutions going forward. Security has become an area of intense cooperation as Mexico grapples with an ongoing wave of brutal crime and violence. The United States and Mexico may not always agree on policy or strategy, but the extensive collaboration among their police and security agencies is unprecedented. Indeed, the bilateral agenda has seen cooperation flourish on almost every issue, with more opportunities emerging as mutual interests deepen. Mexico and the United States are consistently finding new ways to complement and reinforce one another in the global marketplace and on matters of regional and international importance. Both governments have made clear a commitment to consolidate and enhance this cooperation to fully leverage their inevitable and accelerating economic and demographic integration. In many ways, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is complicated and conditioned by the long and the bloody war on drugs. It's difficult to say exactly how many people have been killed in that war, but Mexican media have estimated that around 70,000 people have died since 2006; many thousands more have been disappeared. The United States has been closely involved, providing money, technology and intelligence to the Mexican government.

#### 2) Politics and the TPP

Hakim et al 2/1 – (Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue Andrés Rozental, member of the Advisor board, president of Rozental & Asociados in Mexico City and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Laura Carlsen, director of the Americas program at the Center for International Policy, Latin America Advisor, February 1, 2013 “Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?” <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3222>) DF

Q: Eduardo Medina-Mora formally presented his credentials to U.S. President Barack Obama on Jan. 14, succeeding Arturo Sarukhán as Mexico's ambassador to Washington. This year also marks the first time in 12 years that both countries are experiencing a change in administrations at the same time. With a new administration in Mexico sworn in last month and a renewed mandate for Obama this year, have the prospects for U.S.-Mexico relations improved? What is on the horizon for U.S.-Mexican relations, and how might they change from recent years? Which bilateral issues are most likely to be addressed? Where do trade ties stand? A: Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue: "Last year's concurrent elections in Mexico and the United States produced new opportunities for upgrading the two countries' already robust economic partnership and resolving longstanding bilateral tensions. The decisive impact of the Latino vote on Obama's re-election dramatically increased the prospects for an immigration reform that would make U.S. laws more humane and boost the U.S. and Mexican economies. No policy change would do more to increase goodwill between the two nations. Mexico's economy has shown remarkable vigor in the past three years, and the future could be even brighter. President Peña Nieto is committed to far-reaching economic reforms, including the opening of Mexico's languishing energy sector to private participation. Although it still faces some formidable opposition, energy reform has been gaining political support across the spectrum. Plans include freeing Mexico's national oil company from suffocating constitutional constraints and allowing exploitation of Mexico's immense shale gas reserves. This would be a game-changer for both nations--giving Mexico access to the capital and technology it requires to remain a major oil exporter and setting the stage for a North American energy market. The U.S. and Mexico, along with Canada, are participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. If successful, the TPP would transform NAFTA into an even stronger trade and investment regime, with common rules of origin and far greater reach. The U.S. and Mexico also have the opportunity to initiate a significant bilateral discussion about alternative crime and drug control policies, including a hard look at legalization measures. It has been decades since even modest headway was made on any of these issues. But the shifting political climate in both countries has paved the way for change. It is now up to the two presidents to take advantage of it."

#### 3) FDI proves – interdependence prevents tensions

Wilson 11 – MA in International Affairs @ American U, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs

(Christopher, “Working Together,” Mexico Institute @ Woodrow Institute, Scholar)//BB

In addition to trade, both Mexicans and Americans have significant foreign investment in each other’s country in a diverse range of industries. Bilateral foreign investment offers benefits to both parties, generating jobs and supporting industries in the host country while generating profits for foreign companies and investors. It is often a pillar of production sharing arrangements. Since 1993, U.S. investment in Mexico and Mexican investment in the United States have skyrocketed to more than six times their 1993 level. While U.S. foreign direct investment, at $90 billion in 2010, is still much larger than investment in the opposite direction, Mexican FDI in the United States, at $12.6 billion, is significant and growing quickly.14 Mexican companies are now industry leaders in at least four areas of the U.S. market: cement, breads and baked goods, tortillas, and milk and dairy products. There are also significant Mexican investments in U.S. media, mining, beverages, retail stores, and other areas of the economy. Consumers may be surprised to learn that brands they are familiar with, like Entenmanns, Sara Lee, Thomas English Muffins, Boboli Pizza Crust, Borden Milk, Weight Watchers Yogurt, Mission Tortillas, Ready-Mix Cement, Tracfone cell phones, Saks Fifth Avenue stores, and even the New York Times, are supported by Mexican investment—as are the U.S. jobs those companies provide.15 Indeed, all but the last two are wholly owned by Mexican companies.16

#### 4) North American Leaders’ Summit

Villarreal 12 – (M. Angeles, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, August 9, 2012 “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf>) DF

Regulatory Cooperation

The United States, Mexico, and Canada have made efforts since 2005 to increase cooperation on security and economic issues through various endeavors, most notably by participating in trilateral summits known as the North American Leaders Summits. The most recent Summit was hosted by President Barack Obama on April 2, 2012, in Washington, DC, at the White House, where he met with Mexican President Felipe Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to discuss the economic well-being, safety, and security of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. After the meeting, the three leaders issued a joint statement in which they renewed their commitment to North American cooperation in the following key areas of interest: protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR); enhancement of collective energy security, including the safe and efficient exploration and exploitation of resources; advancement of the goals of the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas and enhancement of electricity interconnection in the Americas; support of efforts to advance a lasting global solution to the challenge of climate changes; and the recognition of the importance of adopting the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, including Canada’s commitment to ratifying the Convention and Mexico’s necessary preparations for signing it. In addition, the leaders announced the North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza (NAPAPI) to strengthen North America’s response to future animal and pandemic influenza events. In the area of strengthening security in the Americas and concerns about transnational organized crime, the three governments agreed to launch in 2012 a consolidated Central America Integration System-North America Security Dialogue to deepen regional security coordination and cooperation.

### 2NC – Drug war declining

#### Drug trade declining – no impact uniqueness:

#### a) Nieto policy – refocus away from armed street conflicts reduces deaths.

#### b) Experts – Mexican intelligence officials agree – 18% decrease in conflict – proves low probability and long timeframe – no spillover – that’s WSJ.

### 2NC – AT: Drug war

#### No impact to drug instability:

#### a) Empirics – mass cartel violence hasn’t spilled over – disproves magnitude and timeframe. Status quo violence isn’t causing extinction – we control terminal impact uniqueness.

#### b) Political institutions – trade blocs prevent conflict – oil interdependence means no war – empirics – that’s Coll.

#### c) Causality – the impact only goes one way – drug trafficking in Mexico contributes to regional stability – money laundering ensures investment in legitimate businesses – props up the economy – that’s Friedman.

#### The aff only makes it worse:

#### 1) Scale – drug trade is worth more than all of Mexico’s legitimate industries

Lange 10 – Washington Correspondent for Reuters, citing US officials in Mexico; additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana (Jason, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs,” Reuters, 22 January 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122)//BI>

Mexican cartels, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring an estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. To put that in perspective: Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico. It has even propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said George Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. "The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said. During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Guillermo Ibarra of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that to a certain extent helped the banks," Ibarra said. Indeed, drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy.

#### 2) Empirics – past crackdowns caused economic destabilization

Gray 10 – Economic Analyst at U.S. Government Accountability Office, Research Assistant at National Bureau of Economic Research (Colin, “The Hidden Cost of the War on Drugs,” Stanford Progressive, May 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?p=521)//BI>

While violence is escalating and some are calling Mexico a failed state, the Mexican effort has certainly disrupted the drug trade. Officials point to evidence of criminal organizations diversifying as drug revenues begin to dry up and to the rising price of cocaine. As early as the second quarter of 2007, the White House reported cocaine shortages in 37 U.S. cities and a 24% increase in the drug’s retail price. Yet, such disruption of the trade has revealed a new issue: the dependence on the drug trade by many parts of the Mexican economy. In considering how to fight illicit drugs in Mexico, it is crucial to consider how a blow to drugs may damage other sectors and industries. As a net effect, most experts would agree that the illicit drug trade adversely affects the Mexican economy. Cartels undermine the rule of law. Instability alienates current investors and deters potential investors or business-owners. Government revenues fall, as taxable commodities are replaced in the economy by illegal goods that are not taxed by the government. Tourism, one of Mexico’s most important exports, suffers: the U.S. military has officially discouraged travelers from vacationing in many parts of Mexico. Drug cartels often intervene in economies directly, further discouraging investment. According to the L.A. Times, the Zetas (the military arm of the Gulf Cartel) “have proved to be ruthless overlords. They have kidnapped businessmen, demanded protection money from merchants, taken over sales of pirated CDs and DVDs and muscled into the liquor trade by forcing restaurant and bar owners to buy from them.” Viridiana Rios of the Harvard Department of Government estimates that “the cost of violence is equivalent to 1.07 billion dollars, investment losses accounts for other 1.3 billion, drug abuse generates a loss of 0.68 billion dollars, and other costs may have an impact as high as 1.5 billion dollars.” Despite the net damage that such cartels create in the Mexican economy, the issue is not as homogenous as it initially appears. In fact, the Mexican economy is, in many ways, dependent on this industry. Economists estimate that the industry brings in between U$25 billion and U$50 billion every year. In 2009, Mexico probably made more money in the drug trade than it did in its single largest export industry: oil. One study, noted by Global Envision, reported that “the loss of the drug business would shrink Mexico’s economy by 63 percent.” Others attribute as much as 20% of Mexico’s GDP to this industry. Mexican journalist Carlos Loret de Mola claims that cartels make three times as many profits as Mexico’s 500 largest companies combined. Furthermore, the effects of a blow to drugs would not be uniformly felt in Mexico. Certain legal industries would be hit harder. Luxury goods, for example, have thrived in Mexico due to the lavish tastes of drug dealers, smugglers, and organizers. These include cars, flight schools, yachts, and the like. While drug lords do not single-handedly keep such industries afloat, they do provide significant business. Some argue that banks are inadvertently dependent on drug money, and may have stayed afloat during the crisis partly due to this money. While deposits are usually made into thousands of different accounts, the money flowing through the banking system provided valuable liquidity during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. By far, the people most hurt by a blow to the drug cartels would be the rural poor in certain areas of Mexico. According to Ms. Rios: “drug traffic cash flows are in fact helping some Mexican communities to somehow alleviate a grinding stage of poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, for almost all drug-producing communities, the drug traffic industry seems to be the only source of income.” This is partly due to the nature of drug cultivation, which, in many ways, is similar to farming. As of the late 1990′s, roughly 300,000 peasants were employed in drug production. The National Farm Workers’ Union (UNTA) estimates a number around 600,000. The importance of drugs in the area is nothing new. The earliest documented poppy production in the state of Sinaloa, called “the heart of Mexican drug country” by Newsweek, was in 1886. The extent of this dependence was illustrated in 1976, when a joint operation by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Mexican government was organized. Called “Operacion Condor”, it involved helicopters that would spray (and ruin) poppy and marijuana fields. The operation caused such immediate economic destabilization in the region that the Mexican government indefinitely halted the project. This dependence on drug cultivation, especially on the labor-intensive process of processing poppy gum, still exists today.

#### 3) Magnitude – Mexican economic stability is a greater internal link – economic collapse causes migration and investor freakout – turns case.

### 2NC – AT: Bioterror

#### No bioterror – that’s leitenberg – terrorists can’t get acquisition or dispersal mechanisms – took the us and soviets years and we still failed

#### No risk and border counterterror increasing

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.

#### No extinction – Tamil tigers prove

O’Neill 4O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

## Trade

### AT: Trade wars

**Protectionism isn’t a sufficient catalyst for nuclear escalation**

**Bremmer 9 —** IR prof, Columbia. Faculty member at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute. PhD in pol sci, Stanford. (Ian, “The Political Risks From Washington,” 24 March 2009, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/top\_five\_risks\_and\_a\_red\_herri.html, AMiles)

There is one serious risk I think we can downplay—a global trade war. The past months have brought all sorts of fears of growing US protectionism and the spiraling international reaction. And a wide array of localized protectionist measures have been taken around the world-indeed, the world bank has counted about 50 trade restrictive actions and only a dozen liberalizing ones since the G20 countries promised to forestall protectionism last November. To list just a few examples--multiple countries have given low cost or no cost cash to their automakers; the United States has restricted stimulus procurement to a subset of countries under a "Buy American" provision; in response to US cancellation of a Mexican trucking program that country has put over $2 billion in tariffs in place on trade with the United States. But thinking about the magnitude rather than the quantity of events uncovers that this is more conventional, rather narrow protectionism than the opening salvos of a trade war. Certainly in the United States, the highest stakes for protectionism are around the automotive sector (after all, the millions of jobs potentially at stake would undo the Obama administration's job preservation goals in one swoop). But there has been no serious suggestion of raising tariffs on foreign autos, and congressional votes and nationwide polls have made clear that there is no public will to keep the industry alive through massive subsidy. If the auto sector-where unionized labor and management could easily point to foreign competition as a cause of its problems-is not enough to merit nuclear protectionism, what is? Nothing, probably. The biggest silver lining to the economic and financial crisis in the United States is that it has very little to do with globalization. To date, there has been no blaming foreigners; rather, the recession has been a story of domestic greed and poor oversight. Certainly, as Americans feel poorer, the risk of redistribution from the have-lots to the have-littles increases. But it's not a backlash against interconnectedness, trade, or global supply chains.

**Negative incentives check**

**Guoqiang 9** — Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Foreign Economic Research Department of the Development Research Center of the State Council, PRC. MS in management science and PhD in economics. (Long, “Is Protectionism a Threat to the World Economy?,” 6 March 2009, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance\_investment/2009/03/06/131493.shtml, AMiles)

I don't think we'll end up with a trade war. Countries mostly adopt protectionist measures within the WTO framework. There are two reasons--the first is that all the countries have something in common in prosting protectionism, second, countries have emphasized corporation at recent top-level meetings. If some country dared to really put up protectionist barriers, it would open up a hornets' nest of criticism against them. Second, trade retaliation forces parties to weigh the pros and cons before taking protectionist measures. So while protectionism is sure to rise, it would not have a big impact. Periodic trade disputes will be unavoidable in the near future, but there would be little possibility of trade conflicts. I treat frictional trade rhetoric as a part of the bilateral negotiation process. It just becomes more intense during times of crisis.

### AT: Interdependence solves

#### Interdependence can’t solve war – that’s May – economists thought European interdependence was sufficient to solve all conflicts before World War I – we control empirics and prove that there’s no threshold for their trade impacts.

**Empirics prove**

**Martin 6** — prof pol sci, U France. Chair in Economics at the Paris School of Economics. Former economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Former assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Visiting researcher at Princeton. PhD from Georgetown. (Phillipe, “Make Trade not War?,” 12 April 2006, http://www.ecore.be/Papers/1177063947.pdf, AMiles)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows, and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: the main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again1. Figure 1 suggests 2 however that on the 1870-2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the XIXth century, was a period of rising trade openness and of multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

**Peace causes trade, not vice versa**

**Mueller 9** — pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.PDF, AMiles)

This already seems to hold for the relationship between peace and trade. Although expanding trade and interactions may enhance or reinforce the process, attitude toward war is likely to be the key explanatory variable in the relationship. Thus, it has frequently been observed that militarized disputes between countries reduce trade between them (Pollins 1989a; Pollins 1989b; Li and Sacko 2002). By contrast, if a couple of countries that have previously enjoyed a conflictual relationship lapse into a comfortable peace and become extremely unlikely to get into war, businesses in both places may well become inclined to explore the possibilities for mutually beneficial exchange. Similarly, although international institutions and norms often stress peace, they, like expanded trade flows, are not so much the cause of peace as its result. Many of the institutions that have been fabricated in Europe--particularly ones like the coal and steel community that were so carefully forged between France and Germany in the years following World War II--have been specifically designed to reduce the danger of war between erstwhile enemies. However, since it appears that no German or Frenchman in any walk of life at any time since 1945 has ever advocated a war between the two countries, it is difficult to see why the institutions should get the credit for the peace that has flourished between those two countries for the last half century and more.17 They are among the consequences of the peace that has enveloped Western Europe since 1945, not its cause. As Richard Betts puts it for institutions of collective security, "peace is the premise of the system, not the product.18

### AT: Protectionism

#### No protectionism and no impact – doesn’t spill over because emerging markets want foreign investment with China – all their impacts are lashout-based and the US won’t lash out – empirics and causality go neg – trade deficit increasing now, but we’re not doing anything.

#### No motive for protectionism

**Lamont 10** (James, Geithner vows to block protectionism, 7 April 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/370f8d52-421b-11df-9ac4-00144feabdc0.html, AMiles)

Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, said during a two-day visit to India that protectionist measures to prevent jobs from migrating outside the country would do more harm to the US than good. “We are not going to go down that path,” promised Mr Geithner. “We know that it would make us weaker, not stronger.” He also said that the administration of Barack Obama, president, would not seek to curb the investments of US companies overseas as “our fortunes are tied with the world”. There have been proposals to trim the tax privileges of US companies that operate internationally. “American companies are long in the world,” Mr Geithner told Indian business leaders at a discussion hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry. “They are good at what much of the world needs. A huge part of the basic economic challenge we face is to give stronger in- centive for private investment, help support innovation and try to make sure there is more investment and stronger exports globally.” Mr Geithner said Mr Obama was “deeply committed” to trying to build a consensus among Americans for more open trade to support the recovery. “We have got the worst labour market since the Great Depression,” the Treasury secretary said. “Most Americans are still going through an incredibly difficult economic series of challenges and yet we’ve been very successful in working to keep our markets open under all that pressure.”

#### It’s empirically denied and won’t escalate

**Beattie 10** (Alan, Skirmishes are not all-out trade war 14 March 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc4b16f8-2f90-11df-9153-00144feabdc0.html, AMiles)

In truth, everyone should take a deep breath and calm down. While it would be silly to deny there is serious potential for conflict, particularly around the issue of currencies, what we have seen so far is a fairly routine management of trade tensions. True, Washington and Beijing are trading heated accusations over whether China’s continued policy of holding down the renminbi is responsible for global imbalances. But for the moment, as Gary Horlick, Washington lawyer, says: “There seems to be an implicit deal between the US and China not to start a [legal] fight on currencies and to let the lawyers litigate everything else.” The last point is crucial. Those who want to be alarmist can portray the big trading powers – and particularly the US – as embroiled in a tangle of litigation and discord. Just last week Brazil threatened again to impose trade sanctions authorised by the World Trade Organisation after it won a case against Washington over cotton subsidies – a ruling with which the US has yet to comply. Last year Mexico imposed similar sanctions over the US’s failure to implement a North American Free Trade Agreement ruling that Mexican trucks could operate within the US. And there has been litigation between Washington and Beijing, with China blocking US exports of chicken and starting a WTO case over the decision of Barack Obama, US president, to slap emergency restrictions on imports of Chinese tyres. This all might look terrifying, but in reality it is pretty much par for the course. The use of trade restrictions such as anti-dumping duties has been quite restrained. Last week’s monitoring report by the WTO and other international agencies showed the rise in such measures actually slowed at the end of last year. And those who predicted that the Chinese tyres decision would unleash a flood of similar actions have been proved wrong – either because it is hard for petitioners to reach the required standard of proof or because they believe the White House would block future actions for fear of more accusations of protectionism. It would be an exaggeration to say every problem in world trade can be improved by throwing lawyers at it. But it is increasingly true litigation is not a nuclear last resort but merely part of the toolkit of managing trade relations. China, which once reacted to every legal challenge as though it were a declaration of war, has got much savvier. And so to currencies. As Sunday’s intervention from Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, underlined, this is undoubtedly the most serious flashpoint in global trade. But it is worth remembering just how hard it is for the US to do anything about it. One much discussed option is naming China a currency manipulator in the twice-yearly currency report, the next of which is due by mid-April. But even this would do nothing more than compel the US Treasury secretary to negotiate with the Chinese, which he is doing anyway. It resembles the old Robin Williams stand-up routine about an unarmed British policeman trying to apprehend a fleeing suspect: “Stop! Or . . . I’ll shout stop again!” Taking a legal case over exchange rate misalignments to the WTO would probably fail, and take years in any case. The only real route left is to unilaterally slap tariffs on Chinese imports to compensate for alleged currency undervaluation. That would be a nuclear option that really could spark the destruction of the postwar world trading system, and it doesn’t look like the US is quite desperate enough for that yet. A second dip in the US recession and a further sharp unemployment rise might do it, but it is not imminent. Perhaps worrying aloud about global trade has its uses, focusing enough attention on the dangers of protectionism to become a self-denying prophecy. But before justified concern turns into alarm and panic, it is worth remembering that so far we have seen little more than routine skirmishes. It’s not time to break out the tin helmets just yet.

### 2NC – Plurilateralism

#### Even if the WTO goes down, plurilateral institutions check

**Jha 2** project coordinator and representative to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Taught international economics and managerial economics at Oxford, University. B.A. from Lady Shri Ram College, University of Delhi, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics from the Delhi School of Economics and the University of London, respectively. (Veena Jha, Project Coordinator of UNTAD-Dehli, 2002, Salvaging the WTO’s Future, ed. Dasgupta, p. 453)

In other words, the alternative to the WTO is not another institution, but the emergence of several other plurilateral institutions such as MERCOSUR, SAARC, SADCC, ASEAN and others. This is already happening. Instead of overburdening the WTO, it may be useful to discuss public policy issues in these regional forums. Only when a consensus appears to be emerging from these regional forums should the issue be take to the WTO for discussions. Thus regional forums should serve as a filter before taking issues for discussions in the WTO. This would reduce its jurisdiction to manageable limits and make it another institutions coexisting with other international organizations, notably UNCTAD, regional trade groupings, UNDP and several others. It would also ensure that there are multiple checks and balances in the system, which will enable developing countries to develop their own economic, and policy values, its own rhythm of development and strategies of its own choice.

### 2NC – AT: Econ

#### No impact:

#### a) Resilient – central banking solves – the past five global recessions haven’t sparked flashpoints – that’s Zakaria.

#### b) Liberalism solves – ensures trade and economic cooperation over stimulus – makes the cycle self-correcting – that’s Zakaria.

#### And no escalation:

#### 1) It’s just talk – democratic ideals solve

Boehmer 7

(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)

Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### 2) Studies go neg – 93 cases prove no war

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

#### 3) Government intervention – checks total collapse

Zakaria 9 – Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard, He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935, AMiles)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

One can see this same pattern of mistakes in discussions of the global economic crisis. Over the last six months, the doomsday industry has moved into high gear. Economists and business pundits are competing with each other to describe the next Great Depression. Except that the world we live in bears little resemblance to the 1930s. There is much greater and more widespread wealth in Western societies, with middle classes that can withstand job losses in ways that they could not in the 1930s. Bear in mind, unemployment in the non-farm sector in America rose to 37 percent in the 1930s. Unemployment in the United States today is 8.9 percent. And government benefits—nonexistent in the '30s—play a vast role in cushioning the blow from an economic slowdown. The biggest difference between the 1930s and today, however, lies in the human response. Governments across the world have reacted with amazing speed and scale, lowering interest rates, recapitalizing banks and budgeting for large government expenditures. In total, all the various fiscal--stimulus packages amount to something in the range of $2 trillion. Central banks—mainly the Federal Reserve—have pumped in much larger amounts of cash into the economy. While we debate the intricacies of each and every move—is the TALF well -structured?—the basic reality is that governments have thrown everything but the kitchen sink at this problem and, taking into account the inevitable time lag, their actions are already taking effect. That does not mean a painless recovery or a return to robust growth. But it does mean that we should retire the analogies to the Great Depression, when -policymakers—especially cen-tral banks—did everything wrong. We're living in a dangerous world. But we are also living in a world in which deep, structural forces create stability. We have learned from history and built some reasonably effective mechanisms to handle crises. Does that mean we shouldn't panic? Yes, except that it is the sense of urgency that makes people act—even overreact—and ensures that a crisis doesn't mutate into a disaster. Here's the paradox: if policymakers hadn't been scared of another Great Depression, there might well have been one.

# 1NR

### Daowtf

**Our impact takes the aff out—nuclear war would destroy the plan—durable fiat doesn’t solve since a war would reverse outward engagement on other areas as we divert resources**

**The disad turns the case, but not vice versa – the 1nc impacts precede theirs because we have a disad to the process** **of the plan being implemented in the first place**

**DA has a faster timeframe—based on the process of implementation—that outweighs**

**Lind 10** 7-11-10 – policy director of the economic growth program at the New America Foundation [Michael, “Comprehensive reform is overrated. For real change, Washington must think small”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070902352.html>]

The second reason comprehensive reform is problematic is that it assumes an ability to foresee problems and fix them in advance -- a **skill not necessarily found among mere mortals.** The longer the time horizon, the greater the hubris of those who claim to be solving problems not just for today but for generations to come. This overconfidence spans the political spectrum. For example, both liberal environmentalists and conservative deficit hawks rely on sophisticated models to predict dire threats decades away, whether a catastrophic rise in the Earth's temperature or unsustainable entitlement spending. In each case, even slight changes in the variables can make the remote future look either scary or benign. But when scholarship gives way to advocacy, possible problems generations out are often **presented** as all-but-certain disasters -- avoidable only by immediate action. In reality, we have no idea what the global temperature or the budgetary climate will be like in 50 or 100 years. If the United States had adopted a comprehensive energy strategy in the early 1900s, for example, it would have been based on the assumption that known reserves of coal and oil would soon run out. No one could have foreseen the oil reserves of Texas, the Middle East, West Africa and the Gulf of Mexico (including the deep-sea reserves squandered by the BP disaster). We could not have imagined nuclear energy or techniques to reach enormous quantities of shale gas. In the case of budgeting for entitlements, none of the designers of the Social Security system foresaw the rapid expansion of the U.S. population following the immigration reforms of the 1960s, which inevitably increased the number of people receiving benefits. When Alan Greenspan's commission sought to fix Social Security in the 1980s, it did not envision how the bubbles and busts of the 1990s and 2000s would reduce payroll tax revenues by annihilating jobs and reducing wages. Efforts to anticipate the medium-term future are necessary, but **proposals to fix the problems of the remote future are dubious.**

### Turns Democracy

#### Congressional Opposition and partisanship undermine plans credibility

McFaul, ‘6 (David Adesnik is a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Michael McFaul is the Helen and Peter Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution;

director of the Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford

University; and a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

Second, words mattered, especially when they were the president’s and even more so when they enjoy bipartisan support. A consistent message coming out of the White House and echoed throughout the offices of the executive branch as well as on Capitol Hill is the best way to convince friendly dictators that the United States is serious about democracy promotion. Even while acknowledging a general U.S. commitment to democracy, dictators still bend over backward to find evidence that the United States is willing to tolerate their regime. Well aware of the U.S. government’s penchant for alliances with friendly dictatorships, political leaders will look for any indication that either the U.S. president or some of his most influential advisers are not serious about reform. To be credible and effective, the message must be communicated by all U.S. government officials and sustained over a period of years. The worst scenario is when one cabinet official gives a speech categorizing democracy promotion as a U.S. priority while another downplays the significance of this mission. Such mixed messages in the early years of the Reagan administration, especially when the message of support for anti-Communist autocratic regimes came out of the White House, encouraged autocrats that they were too vital to U.S. security interests to be challenged to change. All too frequently, when dealing directly with their counterparts from other countries, diplomats working in-country or closely with a specific country over time tend to soften the message of democracy sent by higher ranks in the government. These lower-level officials believe that they need good contacts in foreign governments to get “more important” business done. Their winks and nods about democracy promotion lead to the unintended consequence of undermining their superiors’ credibility, including that of the president.

#### Link alone turns the entire case

Norris, 11 (John Norris is the Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative. 3/18, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/03/rising_to_the_occasion.html>)

The question is: What do our leaders need to do—to the degree that we can influence events—to help guide the region down the path to democracy and stability instead of chaos? First and foremost, we need to channel the late Republican Sen. Arthur Vandenberg of Ohio, who argued that politics should stop at the water’s edge. In other words, we need to dial down the partisan sniping here at home. The president and Congress need to work together. If we get it wrong in the Middle East, both parties and the American people will reap that ill reward for years to come. Accordingly, the administration should pull in members of Congress, former national security officials of both parties, and other foreign policy experts on a regular basis. These should not be briefings but discussions about how best to navigate the incredibly tricky path before us. The administration needs to be less insular in its decision making and members of Congress need to avoid the cheap thrill of feeding the 24-hour news machine pithy tweets and a steady diet of second guesses. Indeed, it is truly astounding that we may be lurching toward a government shutdown in the middle of the most important events on the international stage in decades. Members of both parties need to understand full well that the American public will view our politicians as spoiled 12-year-olds if they shutter the government at this moment. Is partisan gridlock really the message we want to broadcast to protesters across the Middle East as they risk their lives fighting for the same freedoms we already enjoy? Second, our strategy needs to be clearly communicated to the public. It is encouraging that President Barack Obama is taking to the airwaves tonight to explain our military involvement in Libya and our stakes across the region. The president needs to be communicator in chief during this period and he needs to speak honestly of the risks and rewards as we move forward. At all costs, the administration needs to avoid the trap of thinking that its strategy is too complex to be understood by the general public. If you can’t explain your strategy, it probably isn’t a good one. By the same token, pundits should stop the ridiculous clamoring for a clearly identified endgame for every move the president makes. We are seeing an entire region in upheaval. We have seen protests in 21 countries with a population of more than 425 million people stretching across 4,800 miles. Things will be messy and uncertain for some time. Finally, and perhaps most dauntingly, the United States needs to manage its relationships with several longstanding Middle East allies while not betraying democratic aspirations in these countries. Nations such as Yemen, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have long been key partners in the region but we cannot let that mute our criticisms of what are highly autocratic systems. The administration realized that reform had gained powerful momentum in both Tunisia and Egypt and that it would be counterproductive to be seen as defending antidemocratic regimes. The strategic stakes are even higher in a country like Saudi Arabia. But we need to keep the heat on some of our friends to rule far more democratically even when it produces discomfort for all involved. The Middle East has been hurtled through a period of incredible change during the last three months. Millions of people have marched in the face of armed opposition to speak out and demand their rights. There can be no better time for the United States to demonstrate its own maturity as a democracy by speaking clearly, listening to a diversity of voices, cooling the partisan rhetoric, and understanding that such historic moments are few and far between.

### Turns Credibility

#### Link turns credibility

**A) Destroys perception of unity**

Hamilton ‘03

(Lee, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

Few words in politics are bandied about as much as bipartisanship. All politicians recognize that, like freedom or prosperity, its approval ratings approach 100 percent. Yet translating rhetorical support for bipartisanship into practice can be extremely difficult. Although Americans have consistently said that they want their elected officials to work across party lines, the nation's politics have been excessively partisan over the past several years**.** U.S. foreign policy has suffered as a result. Foreign policy always has more force and punch when the nation speaks with one voice. When the president works with the opposing party and takes its views into consideration, the policy that results is more likely to have strong public support. Such a foreign policy makes the United States more respected and effective abroad. The United States is at a remarkable moment in its history. The international environment is relatively tranquil; there is no major threat to our security; and we enjoy a position of unprecedented economic, political, and cultural preeminence. We must not, however, take these good times for granted. Most Americans have barely begun to comprehend threats now on the horizon. To remain secure, prosperous, and free, the United States must continue to lead. That leadership requires a president and Congress working together to fashion a foreign policy with broad, bipartisan support. **[Continues]** Developing a bipartisan foreign policy will not be easy under any circumstances. We should expect rough patches, but, if Bush takes charge of U.S. foreign policy, reaches out and consults with Congress, builds on the areas of broad agreement, and works hard to reduce the friction around contentious issues, a strong bipartisan foreign policy could emerge. A foreign policy of unity is essential if the United States is to promote its values and interests effectively and help to build a safer, freer, and more prosperous world.

#### B) Kills U.S. negotiating credibility

Winik ‘91

(Jay, Senior Research Fellow – National Defense U. Foundation, Washington Quarterly, Autumn)

Even when working at its smoothest, it will have difficulty doing so effectively. Small-scale Sarajevos and Munichs may well be the norm, and their prevention or containment will require a cohesive nation, acting with a clear and consistent voice in the international arena, which will only happen if a new bipartisanship is forged. Thus, it is demonstrably clear that, in the absence of bipartisanship, dealing with the new international system will be difficult at best and at times next to impossible. Friends and foes alike, watching U.S. indecision at home, will not see the United States as a credible negotiating partner, ally, or deterrent against wanton aggression. This is a recipe for increased chaos, anarchy, and strife on the world scene. The appeal, then, to recreate anew as the hallmark of U.S. efforts abroad the predictability and resolve that can only come from bipartisanship at home is as critical as during the perilous days following World War II.

### Turns Mexico

#### Link alone turns case – collapses signal and credible support -- Material engagement alone insufficient –

Cardenas and Noriega, 12

Roger F. Noriega, José R. Cárdenas, American Enterprise Institute, 12/5/12

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In the final year of the George W. Bush administration, Mexico and the United States agreed on a $1 billion counter-narcotics assistance package. Yet, despite the enormous opportunity this presented to bring Mexico and the United States into a closer and mutually beneficial security cooperation, the aid was so slowly delivered that Mexicans have been left to wonder if their raging drug war is a priority for the United States. Conservative lawmakers who were the driving force behind Plan Colombia a decade ago have been less active on Mexico, focusing instead on border security as a means to fight illegal immigration and leaving Mexicans to square off with bloodthirsty cartels on their own. It is time for the United States to more fully recognize that “Mexico’s drug war” is more accurately “America’s drug war” that Mexico is fighting. The US Department of Justice says that Mexico’s drug-trafficking organizations are the greatest organized crime threat in the United States. The US must suppress demand for illicit drugs through education, treatment, and law enforcement, but helping Mexico sustain this fight is an indispensable responsibility as well. Moreover, increased US bipartisan political support may encourage the Mexican people and their new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, to sustain their antidrug efforts to advance the two countries’ common security, stability, and prosperity. The United States should also provide robust and innovative material support for these efforts and institutionalize law-enforcement cooperation and information sharing that are essential to the common fight against transnational criminal groups. In Central America, the institutions of government and the rule of law have been overwhelmed by the onslaught of criminal gangs that have been displaced by Mexico’s stepped-up law enforcement. Guatemala’s state apparatus has been underfunded for decades, and the institutions of Honduras have been weakened by a succession of populist caudillo presidents, systematic corruption, and the expanding presence of organized crime. El Salvador confronts the unique challenge of hardened gang members deported from the United States maintaining their ties to criminal networks in US urban centers. A public-security crisis in these countries has undermined popular confidence in elected officials and overwhelmed poorly trained and equipped security forces. Unless the United States and neighboring countries organize an international response, several of these countries may soon become ungovernable territories, producing economic failure, civil strife, and refugee crises. This challenge requires a regional rescue plan (led by the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Europe, and the multilateral development banks). The United States should encourage interested nations to organize a summit of governments and institutions to develop such a plan and agree on how it should be implemented and funded. But by far the greatest threat to security and stability in the Americas is the narco-state that has taken root in Venezuela under the unaccountable regime of Hugo Chávez. This hostile regime is managed by Cuba’s security apparatus, funded by China, armed by Russia, and partnered with Iran, Hezbollah, and Colombian and Mexican narco-traffickers. US law enforcement and federal prosecutors have gathered fresh, compelling evidence implicating senior Venezuelan officials and Chávez himself in narcotics trafficking in collusion with Colombian terrorist groups. Chávez has also forged an important strategic alliance with Iran to allow it to evade international sanctions and carry its asymmetrical threat against the United States to the country’s doorstep. Even as the international community implements new financial sanctions to deny Teheran the means to sustain a uranium enrichment program, the regime has established dozens of shadowy commercial enterprises and banks in Venezuela to launder as much as $30 billion through its petro-economy. Certainly the drug kingpins managing Venezuela today have everything to lose when Chávez succumbs to cancer. Several ruthless, anti-United States governments have a stake in trying to engineer a chavista succession, even as the government struggles with an unsustainable fiscal situation, a collapsing economy, social polarization, and a public-security crisis. In short, within the next several years, Venezuela will become a manmade disaster that will impact regional security and energy supply. America’s current policy of evading responsibility for the implosion in Venezuela is untenable and dangerous. Every serious government in the Americas has a stake in addressing these issues before they become unmanageable. The crises in Central America and Venezuela will require US leadership, intelligent diplomacy, and resources to organize an effective multilateral response. The following are recommendations for addressing these issues, listed by country or region. The Americas: Renew emphasis on intelligence capabilities and mission to confront extraregional threats and cross-border criminality; Increase dialogue with regional and European military, intelligence, and security agencies on common threats; Direct US Northern and Southern Commands, the US Coast Guard, and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to provide “surge” engagement plans for additional funding and other support; Ensure better cooperation from the US State Department with law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Mexico: Develop strong bipartisan support in the US Congress for Mexican counternarcotics efforts and for treating Mexico as not just an “enforcer” but an ally against drug trafficking cartels, and emphasize common “North American” strategies; Set up an interagency US-Mexico financial crimes unit based at the US Treasury to improve targeting of organized-crime money-laundering operations to cripple the financial solvency of the cartels.

### Turns Relations

#### Link proves congress won’t pursue policies

**Power 1**

Jonathan Power, M.Sc in economics, columnist, associate at the Transnational Forum for Peace, August 6, 2001, Toronto Star, “Can Powell guide U.S. to quiet diplomacy?” p. Lexis

Engagement, because it is a slow process, depends on the cultivated support of a well-prepared domestic base. When Carter tried to normalize relations with ex-enemy Vietnam, he came up against the antagonism of Congress and the vociferous criticism of veterans' lobbies. Years later, Clinton had more success because he had carefully solicited influential congressional leaders and, with the judicious use of American aid and the incentive of lifting sanctions, persuaded Hanoi's leadership to comply with U.S. demands.

### Turns Trade/Protectionism

#### Link turns case – sends mixed message emboldening protectionism – policy alone isn’t enough – rhetoric matters

Okezie, ‘10

Okezie Chukwumerije, Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University, Houston, Texas, 5/19/10, <http://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Volume%2016.1/Chukwumerije%20MACRO.pdf>

This article evaluates the implications of the emerging trade policy of the Obama administration. The article begins by sketching a picture of the administration‟s trade-related initiatives and situating them in the context of the trade objectives articulated by the president during the last presidential election. The article then examines the trade aspects of the administration‟s stimulus and economic recovery programs. It focuses on their consistency with U.S. international trade obligations and with the long-standing commitment of the United States to a free and open multilateral trading system. The article further explores the policy and political considerations that would affect the implementation of the trade-related aspects of the administration‟s environmental and labor protection initiatives. The article concludes with the caution that Obama‟s mixed messages on trade, measured by his rhetoric and policies, are detrimental to the pro-trade reputation of the United States and might embolden protectionists, both within and outside the United States.

### I—Econ/Trade

#### This will destroy the U.S. and global economy and collapse trade

Davidson, 9/10 (Adam - co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money” 9/10/2013, “Our Debt to Society,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)>)

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.

While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.

The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

Lbl

screwing around with the debt ceiling is much, much more dangerous than screwing around with a shutdown. A shutdown takes a few billion dollars out of the economy each day—not a great idea, particularly in this environment, but hardly calamitous. Failing to raise the debt ceiling will lead to a default on our government debt and trigger a financial crisis that’s potentially worse than the one we’re still recovering from. Our only hope of avoiding this fiasco is to go ahead and have the shutdown, which will allow the public to completely repudiate the GOP before the debt-ceiling comes due.

### 2NC UQ (Also Syria Answers)

**Link determines direction – uniqueness is always in sway but the link is the certain, endgame scenario for passage**

**Will pass—3 filters for evidence—reject evidence that doesn’t assume**

**1) Obama’s PC—resolves the barriers and opposition in their uniqueness cards**

**2) Empirics—Obama made a debt deal in January only because he had credibility—prefer empirics over fear mongering**

**3)** **Shifting focus—moving away from Syria ensures pressure on debt—prefer comparative evidence on competing legislation**

Bohan, 9/11 (Caren, 9/11/2013, “Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911>))

WASHINGTON, Sept 11 (Reuters) - Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.

Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.

But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.

The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.

But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.

"He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.

Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.

He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration's "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.

"He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that's a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said.

BUDGET BATTLES

Among Obama's most immediate challenges are two looming budget fights. By Sept. 30, Congress and the president must agree on legislation to keep federal agencies funded or face a government shutdown.

Two weeks later, Congress must raise the limit on the country's ability to borrow or risk a possible debt default that could cause chaos in financial markets.

On the first budget showdown, Obama may be at a strategic advantage because of divisions among opposition Republicans about whether to use the spending bill to provoke a fight over Obama's signature health care law, known as Obamacare.

House Republican leaders are trying to rally the party around a temporary spending measure that would keep the government funded until Dec. 15 but are facing resistance within their own caucus from some conservatives who want to cut off funding for Obamacare, even if it means a government shutdown.

The debt limit fight could end up going down to the wire and unnerving financial markets. Republicans want to use that standoff to extract concessions from the Democratic president, such as spending cuts and a delay in the health law. But Obama has said he has no intention of negotiating over the borrowing limit.

Another challenge for Obama will be reviving momentum for immigration reform. Sweeping legislation that would grant a path to citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants has passed the Democratic-led Senate but has been stalled in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives.

Over the past week and half, lobbyists and other supporters of immigration reform have become worried that the Syria issue could doom the legislation in the House by limiting the amount of time lawmakers have to consider it.

But lobbyists are not ready to give up and have continued meeting with lawmakers to press the issue.

Some activists believe Obama could create pressure on Republicans to act by making greater use of the bully pulpit. The White House has sought to strike a balance between calling for action and giving Congress space to consider the issue.

Another pressing domestic matter will be picking a candidate to succeed Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose term expires in January. Obama has been leaning toward Lawrence Summers, a former top White House aide and Treasury secretary, who is controversial within his own Democratic Party.

Any candidate for Fed chairman will require confirmation by the U.S. Senate.

On issues like the budget battles in which Obama will go toe-to-toe with Republicans, the Syria push will have little fallout for Obama, predicted Matt Bennett, senior vice president at Third Way, a center-left think tank.

Republicans showed a huge resistance to Obama's agenda well before the administration's effort to win congressional backing on Syria began to falter, Bennett noted. He said the time focused on Syria over the last week and half did nothing to change that dynamic.

"I certainly don't think the situation he's in today is markedly different from the one he faced a

few weeks ago," Bennett said.

#### D) Prefer evidence from White House Officials

Khunhenn, 9/8 (Jim, The Associated Press, “Issues test Obama's persuasion, mobilizing skills,” Lexis))

The tasks stacking up before President Barack Obama over the coming weeks will test his persuasion powers and his mobilizing skills more than any other time in his presidency.

How well Obama handles the challenges in the concentrated amount of time before him could determine whether he leads the nation from a position of strength or whether he becomes a lame duck one year into his second term.

Between now and the end of October, Obama must convince wary lawmakers that they should grant him authority to take military action against Syria; take on Congress in an economy-rattling debate over spending and the nation's borrowing limit; and oversee a crucial step in the putting in place his prized health care law.

The Syria vote looms as his first, biggest and perhaps most defining challenge. His mission is persuading Congress and bringing the public along to approve armed action against the Syrian government in response to a chemical attack that Obama blames on President Bashar Assad's government.

"It's conceivable that, at the end of the day, I don't persuade a majority of the American people that it's the right thing to do," Obama acknowledged in a news conference Friday.

His chief of staff, Denis McDonough, was asked on "Fox News Sunday" whether a congressional rejection might endanger Obama's presidency, and he responded: "Politics is somebody else's concern. The president is not interested in the politics of this."

Presidents tend to have an advantage on issues of national security, a tradition demonstrated by the support Obama has won for action in Syria from the bipartisan leadership of the House. But that has not translated so far into firm support among the rank and file.

"Congress can look presidents in the eye on a level gaze regarding the budget," the presidential historian H.W. Brands said. "But on war and peace they have to look up to the president, he's the commander in chief.

"If he does lose, even if the loss comes about partly as a result from negative Democratic votes, the Republicans are going to get the bit in their teeth and say `We're not going to give this guy anything,'" said Brands, a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, said.

By that reasoning, success on Syria could give Obama some momentum.

"If he gets the authority it shows that he's not a lame duck, that he still has some power," said John Feehery, a Republican strategist and former House GOP leadership aide. "If he doesn't get the authority, it's devastating. People see him as the lamest of lame ducks."

The Syria vote, however, is unusual and probably will not break along traditional partisan or ideological lines. Democrats and Republicans have voiced support and opposition to a military intervention. As a result, some White House officials believe their ability to influence issues that split along party lines is limited.

"It becomes more of a stand-alone," said Republican pollster David Winston, who advises House Republican leaders. "This is a decision distinct from internal domestic politics."

At the White House, Syria for now has eclipsed all other matters.

Obama spent the last two days in St. Petersburg, Russia, trying to build a coalition of support from among the members of the Group of 20 largest economies. Back home, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry made their case to lawmakers in public and in private while Obama lobbied individual members by telephone.

On Tuesday, Obama will speak to the nation during an evening address from the White House, a rare forum reserved for the weightiest of issues. The speech will come a day before the Senate holds its first showdown vote over a resolution authorizing the "limited and specified use" of U.S. armed forces against Syria. The resolution bars the use of U.S. combat troops. A final Senate vote could come at the end of the week. The House would likely take the measure up the following week.

Win or lose, Obama and lawmakers then would run headlong into a debate over the budget.

Congress will have a limited window to continue government operations before the new budget year begins Oct. 1.

Congressional leaders probably will agree to hold spending at current budget levels for about two months or three months. That would delay a confrontation with the White House and pair a debate over 2014 spending levels with the government's need to raise its current $16.7 trillion borrowing limit. The Treasury says the government will hit that ceiling in mid-October.

Obama has been adamant that he will not negotiate over the debt limit. He says a similar faceoff in 2011 hurt the economy and caused Standard & Poors to lower its rating of the nation's debt, which made it more expensive to borrow.

White House officials say they ultimately have leverage because they believe Republicans would be punished politically for playing brinkmanship and threatening the nation with a default.

The White House is counting on pressure from traditional Republican allies, particularly in the business sector. "It is insane not to raise the debt ceiling," U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Donohue said last week on C-SPAN. Donohue pledged to find primary challengers against lawmakers who threaten a default.

#### E) Firm stance

AP, 9/10 (“US could default on its debt obligations by mid-October, thinktank warns,” 9/10/2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/sep/10/us-default-debt-obligations-october-thinktank>))

The United States could default on its obligations as early as October 18 if Washington fails to agree on legislation to raise the government's borrowing cap, a new study predicted Tuesday.

The Bipartisan Policy Center analysis says the default date would come no later than November 5, and that the government would quickly fall behind on its payments, including social security benefits and military pensions.

The thinktank's estimate is in line with a warning last month by Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew that the government would exhaust its borrowing authority by mid-October and be left with just $50bn cash on hand.

The government has never defaulted on its obligations. Raising the $16.7tn borrowing cap promises to be a major struggle for House Republicans and President Obama.

Two years ago Obama agreed to pair a $2.1tn increase in the debt limit with an equivalent amount in spending cuts spread over 10 years. But the president now says that he won't negotiate over the debt limit and is asking Congress to send him a straightforward increase that would ensure the government can pay its bills.

In January, House Republicans permitted an increase in the debt ceiling without demanding offsetting spending cuts.

#### F) Fractured republicans

Allen, 9/12 (Jonathan, 9/12/2013, “White House determined not to give ground on Obamacare,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/white-house-obamacare-debt-negotiations-96741.html?hp=l9)>)

“The biggest thing has been the uniformity in the refusal to negotiate on the debt ceiling,” said Matt House, the communications director for Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.). “We think at the last minute they’re going to be the ones that have to blink and come to us.”

House Republicans are badly fractured over spending. They can’t agree among themselves on whether to keep spending on its current trajectory, cut it further than the caps agreed to in previous budget deals, or, as a handful of Republicans believe, raise it a little bit. More important at the moment, they are divided over whether to shut down the government in the name of starving Obamacare.

### 2NC – Link wall (generic)

#### Link outweighs the link turn:

#### a) Executive authority – plan’s perceived as Obama meddling – triggers GOP backlash – midterms prove they have an incentive to be extremist.

#### b) Riders – normal ratification includes controversial riders – Dodd-Frank exemption proves Obama has to take a stance which invites backlash from the left and the right

Unpopularity alone undermines passage—that’s Haass

A) Warping—Policies get altered by amendments and follow-up policies that undermine its effectiveness—durable FIAT is not a response—their policy is still in place, but OTHER POLICIES are passed to subvert it

B) Perception—even if the policy is durable, it is not PERCIEVED as such, causing people to operate like it will be rolled back—enforcement will also be subverted

#### Obama spends PC opposing Dodd-Frank exemption

Ben Geman, June 25, 2013, staff writer for The Hill, “White House ‘cannot support’ House US-Mexico drilling bill”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/307769-white-house-cannot-support-house-us-mexico-drilling-bill>

The White House said Tuesday that it opposes House legislation to implement a 2012 administration pact with Mexico on Gulf of Mexico drilling cooperation, citing “unnecessary, extraneous provisions that seriously detract from the bill.”¶ The formal statement of administration policy backs the “goal” of the bill that’s coming to the House floor Wednesday to implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement.¶ But it cites provisions in the GOP-crafted bill that exempts oil companies operating under the pact from controversial federal rules that force energy producers to disclose their payments to foreign governments.¶ “As a practical matter, this provision would waive the requirement for the disclosure of any payments made by resource extraction companies to the United States or foreign governments in accordance with a transboundary hydrocarbon agreement. The provision directly and negatively impacts U.S. efforts to increase transparency and accountability, particularly in the oil, gas, and minerals sectors,” the White House Office of Management and Budget said.¶ The White House statement, however, stops short of a veto threat despite saying it "cannot support" the measure. It says the administration looks forward to working with Congress on an implementing bill.¶ Click here for much more on the House bill and its controversial exemption from rules required under the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial overhaul law.¶ The Senate version of the implementing bill, sponsored by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate’s energy committee, does not include the exemption from the Securities and Exchange Commission payment disclosure rules.¶ But proponents of the House measure say the carve-out is needed to prevent a collision with confidentiality provisions in the U.S.-Mexico accord. ¶ The underlying 2012 U.S.-Mexico accord, which has support from Republicans and the administration, is designed to enable cooperation in development of oil-and-gas along a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ “Implementing this Agreement will offer significant opportunities for responsible and efficient exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources in an expanded area along the U.S.-Mexico maritime boundary as well as significant new opportunities for U.S. companies,” the White House said.¶ In a separate statement Tuesday, the White House threatened to veto a separate GOP bill coming to the House floor Wednesday that would require a major expansion of offshore oil-and-gas leasing. ¶ The House has passed similar measures in the last Congress but they did not come up in the Senate.

**But fiat means he loses – that costs PC**

**Simes 10** – \*publisher of the National Interest, Executive Director of The Nixon Center and Associate Publisher of The National Interest, served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005 [12/23, Dimitri and Paul Saunders, National Interest, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626, CR]

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our own conversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that Republican anger over unrelated legislation cost five to ten votes. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had alienated many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty. That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it would not have been so difficult for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to work more cooperatively with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

### AT: Fiat Solves the Link

**Fiat doesn’t solve the link—the plan passes through the least necessary means which still links to the disadvantage—Post-fiat backlash kills political capital**

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**Politics DA’s are good—politics is the reason these affirmatives haven’t been done, which proves they teach poor advocacy skills. It’s key to neg ground—politics is this year’s topic disad—all others lack link uniqueness. It’s also key to educational innovation and civic engagement which are portable skills outside debate**

### 2NC Intrinsicness

**Counterinterp–judge is a citizen**

**It is intrinsic—the government isn’t a monolith—link proves policymakers take political considerations into account**

**Intrinsicness is a voting issue – neg ground – they can solve all disads – forces impact turn debates that kill specific research**

### 2NC No Extinction—Short

**Diseases won’t cause extinction—that’s Posner—err neg**

**A) Empirics—we have survived every disease in the last 200,000 years and none have come close**

**B) Natural selection—diseases that pose too big of a threat burn out.**

**C) Their evidence is alarmism—doesn’t assume co-evolution**

**Achenbach 3** (Joel, Washington Post Staff Writer, "Our Friend, the Plague," Nov, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0311/resources\_who.html, AD: 6/30/09) jl

shimWhenever a new disease appears somewhere on our planet, experts invariably pop up on TV with grave summations of the problem, usually along the lines of, "We're in a war against the microbes"—pause for dramatic effect —"and the microbes are winning." War, however, is a ridiculously overused metaphor and probably should be bombed back to the Stone Age. Paul Ewald, a biologist at the University of Louisville, advocates a different approach to lethal microbes. Forget trying to obliterate them, he says, and focus instead on how they co-evolve with humans. Make them mutate in the right direction. Get the powers of evolution on our side. Disease organisms can, in fact, become less virulent over time. When it was first recognized in Europe around 1495, syphilis killed its human hosts within months. The quick progression of the disease—from infection to death—limited the ability of syphilis to spread. So a new form evolved, one that gave carriers years to infect others. For the same reason, the common cold has become less dangerous. Milder strains of the virus—spread by people out and about, touching things, and shaking hands—have an evolutionary advantage over more debilitating strains. You can't spread a cold very easily if you're incapable of rolling out of bed. This process has already weakened all but one virulent strain of malaria: Plasmodium falciparum succeeds in part because bedridden victims of the disease are more vulnerable to mosquitoes that carry and transmit the parasite. To mitigate malaria, the secret is to improve housing conditions. If people put screens on doors and windows, and use bed nets, it creates an evolutionary incentive for Plasmodium falciparum to become milder and self-limiting. Immobilized people protected by nets and screens can't easily spread the parasite, so evolution would favor forms that let infected people walk around and get bitten by mosquitoes. There are also a few high-tech tricks for nudging microbes in the right evolutionary direction. One company, called MedImmune, has created a flu vaccine using a modified influenza virus that thrives at 77°F instead of 98.6°F, the normal human body temperature. The vaccine can be sprayed in a person's nose, where the virus survives in the cool nasal passages but not in the hot lungs or elsewhere in the body. The immune system produces antibodies that make the person better prepared for most normal, nasty influenza bugs. Maybe someday we'll barely notice when we get colonized by disease organisms. We'll have co-opted them. They'll be like in-laws, a little annoying but tolerable. If a friend sees us sniffling, we'll just say, Oh, it's nothing—just a touch of plague.

### Coercion

### 2NC Overview

**Plan’s coercive—that’s Younkins**

**A) Taxation—Government taxation used to fund the plan is the equivalent of theft—prevents individuals from having freedom with their earnings**

**B) Turns case—The government will perform the plan poorly—it will be mired with bureaucratic failures because they have no incentive to make their programs work since it’s not their money—[this is a conceded argument, no new 1ar answers, destroys debates academic integrity, makes neg strategy impossible]—private actors solve the case**

### 2NC Ethics—Short

**Ethics outweighs**

**A) Can’t predict the future and util causes the worst atrocities**

**Anderson 4** (Kerby, is National Director of Probe Ministries International. He holds masters degrees from Yale University (science) and from Georgetown University (government). “Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number” <http://www.probe.org/site/apps/nlnet/content.aspx?c=fdKEIMNsEoG&b=4282487&ct=5517599> //Donnie)

There are also a number of problems with utilitarianism. One problem with utilitarianism is that it leads to an "end justifies the means" mentality. If any worthwhile end can justify the means to attain it, a true ethical foundation is lost. But we all know that the end does not justify the means. If that were so, then Hitler could justify the Holocaust because the end was to purify the human race. Stalin could justify his slaughter of millions because he was trying to achieve a communist utopia. The end never justifies the means. The means must justify themselves. A particular act cannot be judged as good simply because it may lead to a good consequence. The means must be judged by some objective and consistent standard of morality. Second, utilitarianism cannot protect the rights of minorities if the goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Americans in the eighteenth century could justify slavery on the basis that it provided a good consequence for a majority of Americans. Certainly the majority benefited from cheap slave labor even though the lives of black slaves were much worse. A third problem with utilitarianism is predicting the consequences. If morality is based on results, then we would have to have omniscience in order to accurately predict the consequence of any action. But at best we can only guess at the future, and often these educated guesses are wrong. A fourth problem with utilitarianism is that consequences themselves must be judged. When results occur, we must still ask whether they are good or bad results. Utilitarianism provides no objective and consistent foundation to judge results because results are the mechanism used to judge the action itself.

**B) No value to life under coercion**

**Raz 86** (Joseph, Philosopher, *The Morality of Freedom*, page 307)

One way to test the thesis of the primacy of action reasons is to think of a person who is entirely passive and is continuously led, cleaned, and pumped full with hash, so that he is perpetually content, and wants nothing but to stay in the same condition. It’s a familiar imaginary horror. How do we rank the success of such a life? It is not the worst life one can have. It is simply not a life at all. It lacks activity, it lacks goals. To the extent that one is tempted to judge it more harshly than that and to regard it as a ‘negative life’ this is because of the wasted potentiality. It is a life which could have been and was not. We can isolate this feature by imagining that the human being concerned is mentally and physically effected in a way which rules out the possibility of a life with any kind of meaningful pursuit in it. Now it is just not really a life at all. This does not preclude one from saying that it is better than human life. It is simply sufficiently unlike human life in the respects that matter that we regard it as only a degenerate case of human life. But clearly not being alive can be better than that life.

**C) This is a debate round—we don’t have control over levers of power—their inherency and 1ac impacts prove that extinction is inevitable since the plan won’t be done—we should use this form to learn to be ethical**

**D) The government can’t manage problems—their ideology culminates in extinction**

**Rockwell** **3** (Llewellyn H. Jr., president of the Mises Institute, The Free Market, The Mises Institute Monthly, “The Hayek Moment,” May 2003, vol. 21, no.5, www.mises.org/freemarket\_detail.asp?control=439&sortorder=articledate, JMP) \*\*\*note: gender modified

The relevance of Hayek in our times extends beyond just business cycle analysis. In later years, Hayek turned his attention to other matters concerning the methods of science (he decried the "pretense of knowledge" affected by social scientists) and the uses of power in society. His Road to Serfdom warned that the regimentation of totalitarian societies can only come to Britain and the US through central planning. What is at stake, he wrote, is not just productive economies but freedom itself. In our time, that freedom is threatened by intervention in every aspect of economic life but also through the use of military power. Government not only claims it is smart enough to manage the economy, fix up our communities, run our schools, but also to decide which foreign politicians deserve to be protected and which deserve to be destroyed. The implicit assumption is always that government knows more and better than the rest of us, and that this knowledge is sufficient to give it rights the rest of us do not have. It is often said that knowledge is power. In the case of government, however, its power **vastly exceeds** its knowledge. When Alan Greenspan of the Fed (a branch of government in every important respect) testifies before Congress, legislators listen attentively to find out what he knows about the state of the economy, as if he has some privileged access to high-level data not reported elsewhere. It is further assumed that he knows precisely how to act on it. It is this knowledge that allows him to operate the gears and levers of the economy, so it is believed. The same assumptions are made about many aspects of government. Many people who have backed war with Iraq assume that the government must know something awful about Saddam that it cannot share with the general public. It's true, they admit, that Saddam does not have nuclear weapons and that there is not public information that suggests he is plotting the destruction of America as we know it. But surely the White House must know something we do not, and know what to do about it, else why would the administration be so intent on removing him from power? The belief that powerful people know more than the rest of us is a **main source** of their power. It's true only to this extent: powerful people are likely to know when they are telling the truth and when they are not. The rest of us are put in a position of having to guess or dig to verify their claims point by point. Experience teaches that politicians often lie. But there's an even more important point: because government activity takes place outside the framework of the market economy, government **has no idea** how to use the information it does have to achieve social good. Think of all the bits of information the government had been collecting to assess the likelihood of a terrorist incident. A few warnings among tens of thousands of tips did not suffice to prevent this destructive attack. The accumulation of information has grown steadily more voluminous. The government is in no better position to make judgments about it today than it was two years ago. In contrast, insurance companies are in the business of assessing risk all the time, and they do this by means of a system of profit and loss, which Mises demonstrated is essential to a rationally organized society. Government, on the other hand, just collects piles of data and is completely at a loss on how to assess the relative likelihood of any particular scenario, or what to do about it. Remember this winter's now-famous announcement that Americans should stock up on duct tape to protect themselves from chemical warfare. People rushed to the stores and cleaned out the shelves. Later it turned out that duct taping windows can be very dangerous and even cause asphyxiation. Not only that: the tip concerning the coming bio-terrorism was a hoax. The "high alert"—as if that means anything to regular people—that government told Americans to be on was not justified. In contrast, the private sector enhances security through peaceful and normal means. Home insurance companies give premium breaks for people who install alarm systems. Health insurers charge more for people who live dangerously. Premiums go up when risk is high and they fall when it is low. Through this mechanism, people are encouraged to adopt safe ways of living or pay the difference if they choose not to. Those who contract to provide security face competition and have the incentive and means to provide what they promise. What a contrast to the chaotic and fumbling ways of government security provision! But failure does not deter the state. Indeed, we are now asked to believe that the White House is not only omnipotent but omniscient as well. These people in government presume to make definitive judgments about the entire Iraqi ruling class, even going so far as to say that they know the secret hostility of a huge range of people toward Saddam, which thus qualifies them (who just happen to have essential technical knowledge) to help in administering the country. They can't possibly know this. That they believe they can, or they believe we will believe their claims to know, is incredible and frightening. The alarming reality brings to mind Hayek's Nobel Prize lecture in 1974. With great courage, Hayek spoke of the tendency of economists to presume that they know things about human behavior that they do not and cannot know. They do this because they try to apply the models of the physical sciences to explain human action, always with an aim toward controlling the outcomes of human choice. In truth, human action is too complex and subjective to be accessed by social scientists, and the attempt will always lead to abysmal failure. Hayek went on to explain how his critique of positivist economic modeling applies more broadly to anyone who would attempt to imitate the form while missing the substance of scientific procedure. "But it is by no means only in the field of economics that far-reaching claims are made on behalf of a more scientific direction of all human activities and the desirability of replacing spontaneous processes by 'conscious human control'." He mentions that the point applies to sociology, psychiatry, and the philosophy of history. Hayek was raising an objection not to the idea of omniscience but of the possibility of accessing even mundane knowledge. No small group in government, much less a single person, can accumulate and sort through the kinds of information **necessary to administer society**, much less destroy and reconstruct one, as the Bush administration proposes to do throughout the Gulf region and the Middle East. The attempt to assemble such a list is an act of power, not intelligence. We are being asked to make an enormous leap of faith that the Bush administration has somehow solved the great problem that afflicts us all: the limits of human comprehension. Because of those limits, we are right to try to limit the ability of men to exercise power over their fellows, at home or abroad. Thus does Hayek's point apply to politics, especially to politics, even more especially to the politics of the military machine. The social scientist who believes he has the master plan to run the world is enough of a menace. But the politician who believes this, and is contemplating war, can bring about massive **amounts of destruction and death**. In these **nuclear days**—and let us say what we don't like to contemplate but which is nonetheless true—[they] he can bring about the **end of the world** as we know it. As Hayek notes, a tyrant who carries the pretense of knowledge too far can become **"a destroyer of civilization."** "If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order," said Hayek, "he will have to learn that . . . he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make mastery of the events possible." To believe otherwise is foolhardy and dangerous. "The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society."

**E) State cooption turns case**

**Browne 95** – former Libertarian Party candidate and Director of Public Policy, American Liberty Foundation (Harry, Why Government Doesn’t Work, p 19-20, AG)

To get it enacted you’ll need political allies, since alone you have only limited influence. But other people will support your plan and work for it only if you modify it in dozens of ways that further their goals and satisfy their opinions. Suppose you make the necessary compromises and amass enough support to pressure the politicians to vote for your revised program. Who will write the actual law? You? Of course not. It will be written by the same legislators and aides who created all the laws, programs, and problems you object to now. Each of them will compromise your program still further to satisfy his political supporters. And if the law passes, who will administer it? You? Of course not. It will be implemented by bureaucrats — many of whom will use it to pursue goals quite different from what you had in mind. They won’t care what your purpose was. It’s their law now, and they’ll use it to suit their objectives. And, lastly, the new law probably will generate many disputes — cases that must be settled in a courtroom. Who will decide those cases? You? Of course not. It will be the same judges who today rule according to their own beliefs, rather than by reference to the written law. A judge may even rule that your law means exactly the opposite of what you had intended. By the time your program has run this gauntlet, it will be far bigger and far more expensive (in money and disrupted lives) than you had imagined. And it will have been twisted to satisfy many factions. In fact, **your program may end up** being **the opposite of what you** had **intended.**

**F) Extinction is justified even if it risks future generations**

**Shue, 89** – Professor of Ethics and Public Life at Princeton University (Henry, 1989, Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Google Books, p. 64-65)

The issue raises interesting problems about obligations among generations. What obligations do we owe to future generations whose very existence will be affected by our risks? A crude utilitarian calculation would suggest that since the pleasures of future generations may last infi­nitely (or until the sun burns out), no risk that we take to assure certain values for our generation can compare with almost infinite value in the future. Thus we have no right to take such risks. In effect, such an approach would establish a dictatorship of future generations over the present one. The only permissible role for our genera­tion would be biological procreation. If we care about other values in addition to survival, this crude utilitarian approach produces intolerable consequences for the current generation. Moreover, utility is too crude a concept to support such a calculation. We have little idea of what utility will mean to generations very distant from ours. We think we know something about our children, and perhaps our grandchil­dren, but what will people value 8,000 years from now? If we do not know, then there is the ironic prospect that something we deny ourselves now for the sake of a future generation may be of little value to them. A more defensible approach to the issue of justice among generations is the principle of equal access. Each generation should have roughly equal access to important values. We must admit that we shall not be certain of the detailed prefer­ences of increasingly distant generations, but we can as­sume that they will wish equal chances of survival. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume that they would want survival as a sole value any more than the current generation does. On the contrary, if they would wish equal access to other values that give meaning to life, we could infer that they might wish us to take some risks of species extinction in order to provide them equal access to those values. If we have benefited from "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," why should we as­sume that the next generation would want only life?

### 2NC Ethics—Extra

**G) Intervening actors check their impacts**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

We may note, first, that many of the key concepts and ideas are quite new, including the very notion of existential risk. Without the requisite concepts in place, momentum for efforts to understand and mitigate existential risk could not build; and this may help explain the primitive state of the art. In many instances, the underlying science and the methodological tools for studying existential risks in a meaningful way have also only recently become available. It is arguably only since the detonation of the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, and the subsequent nuclear buildup during the Cold War, that any significant naturalistic (i.e., non‐supernatural) existential risks have arisen—at least if we count only risks over which human beings have some influence.35 The most significant existential risks still seem to lie many years into the future. Until recently, therefore, there may have been relatively little need to think about existential risk in general and few opportunities for mitigation even if such thinking had taken place. Public awareness of the global impacts of human activities appears to be increasing. Systems, processes, and risks are studied today from a global perspective by many scholars, including environmental scientists, economists, epidemiologists, and demographers. Problems such as climate change, cross‐border terrorism, and international financial crises help to direct attention to global interdependency and threats to the global system. The idea of risk in general seems to have risen in prominence.36 Given these advances in knowledge, methods, and attitudes, the conditions for securing for existential risks the scientific scrutiny they deserve are unprecedentedly propitious. Opportunities for action may also increase. As noted, some mitigation projects can be undertaken unilaterally, and one may expect more such projects as the world becomes richer. Other mitigation projects require wider coordination—in many cases, global coordination. Here, too, some trend lines seem to show this becoming more feasible over time. There is a long‐term historic trend toward increasing the scope of political integration—from hunter‐gatherer bands to chiefdoms, city states, nation states, and now multinational organizations, regional alliances, various international governance structures, and other aspects of globalization.(56) Extrapolation of this trend would point to the creation of a singleton.(57) It is also possible that some of the global movements that have been emerging over the last half century—in particular, the peace movement, the environmentalist movement, and various global justice and human‐rights movements—will gradually take on board more generalized concerns about existential risk.37 Furthermore, to the extent that existential‐risk mitigation really is a most deserving cause, one may expect that general improvements in society’s ability to recognize and act on important truths will differentially funnel resources into existential‐risk mitigation. General improvements of this kind might arise from advances in educational techniques, institutional innovations (e.g., prediction markets), advances in science and philosophy, spread of rationality culture, biological cognitive enhancement, and many other sources. Finally, it is possible that the cause will at some point receive a boost from the occurrence of a major (nonexistential) catastrophe that underscores the precariousness of the present human condition. That would, needless to say, be the worst possible way for our minds to be concentrated—yet one which, in a multidecadal time frame, must be accorded a non‐negligible probability of occurrence.38

**H) We control empirics—cause-and-effect claims require a coherent theory of human behavior – their advantages are epistemologically unacceptable and make unending violence inevitable**

**Rockwell** Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 5/19/200**8** (Llewellyn, “Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism,” <http://mises.org/story/2982>)

Not even an event as spectacular as the spontaneous meltdown of a superpower and all its client states was enough to impart the message of economic freedom. And the truth is that it was not necessary. The whole of our world is covered with lessons about the merit of economic liberty over central planning. Our everyday lives are dominated by the glorious products of the market, which we all gladly take for granted. We can open up our web browsers and tour an electronic civilization that the market created, and note that government never did anything useful at all by comparison. We are also inundated daily by the failures of the state. We complain constantly that the educational system is broken, that the medical sector is oddly distorted, that the post office is unaccountable, that the police abuse their power, that the politicians have lied to us, that **tax dollars are stolen**, that whatever bureaucracy we have to deal with is inhumanly unresponsive. We note all this. But far fewer are somehow able to **connect the dots** and see the myriad ways in which daily life confirms that the market radicals like Mises, Hayek, Hazlitt, and Rothbard were correct in their judgments. What's more, this is not a new phenomenon that we can observe in our lifetimes only. We can look at any country in any period and note that every bit of wealth ever created in the history of mankind has been generated through some kind of market activity, and never by governments. Free people create; states destroy. It was true in the ancient world. It was true in the first millennium after Christ. It was true in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. And with the birth of complex structures of production and the increasing division of labor in those years, we see how the accumulation of capital led to what might be called a productive miracle. The world's population soared. We saw the creation of the middle class. We saw the poor improve their plight and change their own class identification. **The empirical truth has never been hard to come by**. **What matters are the theoretical eyes that see**. This is what dictates the lesson we draw from events. Marx and Bastiat were writing at the same time. The former said capitalism was creating a calamity and that abolition of ownership was the solution. Bastiat saw that statism was creating a calamity and that the abolition of state plunder was the solution. What was the difference between them? They saw the same facts, but they saw them in very different ways. They had a different perception of cause and effect. I suggest to you that there is an important lesson here as regards **the methodology of the social sciences**, as well as an agenda and strategy for the future. Concerning method, we need to recognize that Mises was precisely right concerning the relationship between facts and economic truth. If we have a solid theory in mind, the facts on the ground provide excellent illustrative material. They inform us about the application of theory in the world in which we live. They provided excellent anecdotes and revealing stories of how economic theory is confirmed in practice. **But absent that theory of economics**, **facts alone are nothing but facts**. **They do not convey any information about cause and effect**, and they do not point a way forward. Think of it this way. Let's say you have a bag of marbles that is turned upside down on the ground. Ask two people their impressions. The first one understands what numbers mean, what shapes mean, and what colors mean. This person can give a detailed account of what he sees: how many marbles, what kinds, how big they are, and this person can explain what he sees in different ways potentially for hours. But now consider the second person, who, we can suppose, has absolutely no understanding of numbers, not even that they exist as abstract ideas. This person has no comprehension of either shape or color. He sees the same scene as the other person but cannot provide anything like an explanation of any patterns. He has very little to say. All he sees is a series of random objects. Both these people see the same facts. But they understand them in very different ways, owing to the abstract notions of meaning that they carry in their minds. This is why positivism as pure science, a method of assembling a potentially infinite series of data points, is a fruitless undertaking. Data points on their own convey no theory, suggest no conclusions, and offer no truths. To arrive at truth requires the most important step that we as human beings can ever take: thinking. Through this thinking, and with good teaching and reading, we can put together a coherent theoretical apparatus that helps us understand. Now, we have a hard time conjuring up in our minds the likes of a man [person] who has no comprehension of numbers, colors, or shapes. And yet I suggest to you that this is precisely what we are facing when we encounter a person who has never thought about economic theory and never studied the implications of the science at all. The facts of the world look quite random to this person. He sees two societies next to each other, one free and prosperous and the other unfree and poor. He looks at this and concludes nothing important about economic systems because he has never thought hard about the relationship between economic systems and prosperity and freedom. He merely accepts the existence of wealth in one place and poverty in the other as a given, the same way the socialists at a lunch table assumed that the luxurious surroundings and food just happened to be there. Perhaps they will reach for an explanation of some sort, but **absent economic education**, it is not likely to be the correct one. Equally as dangerous as having no theory is having a bad theory that is assembled not by means of logic but by an incorrect view of cause and effect. This is the case with notions such as the Phillips Curve, which posits a tradeoff relationship between inflation and unemployment. The idea is that you can drive unemployment down very low if you are willing to tolerate high inflation; or it can work the other way around: you can stabilize prices provided you are willing to put up with high unemployment. Now, of course this makes no sense on the microeconomic level. When inflation is soaring, businesses don't suddenly say, hey, let's hire a bunch of new people! Nor do they say, you know, the prices we pay for inventory have not gone up or have fallen. Let's fire some workers! This much is true about macroeconomics: It is commonly treated like a subject completely devoid of any connection to microeconomics or even human decision making. It is as if we enter into a video game featuring fearsome creatures called Aggregates that battle it out to the death. So you have one creature called Unemployment, one called Inflation, one called Capital, one called Labor, and so on until you can construct a fun game that is sheer fantasy. Another example of this came to me just the other day. A recent study claimed that labor unions increase the productivity of firms. How did the researchers discern this? They found that unionized companies tend to be larger with more overall output than nonunionized companies. Well, let's think about this. Is it likely that if you close a labor pool to all competition, give that restrictive labor pool the right to use violence to enforce its cartel, permit that cartel to extract higher-than-market wages from the company and set its own terms concerning work rules and vacations and benefits — is it likely that this will be good for the company in the long run? You have to take leave of your senses to believe this. In fact, what we have here is a simple mix-up of cause and effect. Bigger companies tend to be more likely to attract a kind of unpreventable unionization than smaller ones. The unions target them, with federal aid. It is no more or less complicated than that. It is for the same reason that developed economies have larger welfare states. The parasites prefer bigger hosts; that's all. We would be making a big mistake to assume that the welfare state causes the developed economy. That would be as much a fallacy as to believe that wearing $2,000 suits causes people to become rich. I'm convinced that Mises was right: the most important step economists or economic institutions can take is in the direction of public education in economic logic. There is another important factor here. **The state thrives on an economically ignorant public**. This is the only way it can get away with blaming inflation or recession on consumers, or claiming that the government's fiscal problems are due to our paying too little in taxes. It is economic ignorance that permits the regulatory agencies to claim that they are protecting us as versus denying us choice. It is only by keeping us all in the dark that it can continue to **start war after war** — **violating rights abroad and smashing liberties at home** — in the name of spreading freedom. There is only one force that can put an end to the successes of the state, and that is an economically and morally informed public. Otherwise, the state can continue to spread its malicious and destructive policies.

**I) Their evidence is skewed to create an automatic reliance on government officials and “reliable experts”**

**Davidson 6** (Lawrence, professor of Middle East history at West Chester University of Pennsylvania, Middle East Policy, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” Summer, vol. 13, no. 2, p.134, Proquest, JMP)

CREATING A CLOSED INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The United States takes great pride in its free press. So, we can ask, can that press be relied upon to supply objective information that will allow Americans to see through the trick of presenting special interests as national interests? The answer, most of the time, turns out to be no. As suggested above, our free press with its automatic reliance on government officials and "reliable experts" is also often a skewed press. It must also be kept in mind that the components of the American media are for-profit businesses owned by individuals and corporations supportive of (or at least responsive to) the very interest groups that seek to maintain the privatized status of aspects of American foreign policy.12 And, almost all news outlets have financial reasons not to frighten off advertisers by becoming associated with unpopular positions. Thus, America's mainstream media outlets will usually not give the public all sides of a story. Therefore, unless a citizen takes the trouble to look for a small number of publications known for their skeptical analysis of government policy and special interest influence, or to go to the Web to search out similarly skeptical blogs, or to read foreign news sources, one is condemned to a "closed information environment." However, it is yet another aspect of the provincial nature of the citizenry that most, even when confronted with important events, will feel no need to search for alternative sources of information. Most will feel comfortable with their traditional sources - local newspapers, the betterknown news magazines, radio talk shows, and especially television." A major consequence of this information dependency is that it becomes relatively easy, as Chomsky and Herman put it, to **"manufacture consent"**14 by creating pictures of events and situations that may be biased to favor particular interests. This can be done by consistently presenting and interpreting the news in a certain biased way or by simply leaving out important information judged by editors, owners and financial backers to be undesirable. Nowhere is this practice more evident than in coverage of events in the Middle East. For instance, the recent coverage of Hamas's January 2006 electoral victory in Palestine, the February 2005 Hariri assassination in Lebanon and the ongoing Iranian nuclear debate was skewed in this fashion so as to maintain an interpretation of events generally in line with that of neoconservative and Zionist special interests. The mainstream press, whether conservative or liberal, gave background information that emphasized Hamas's status as a terrorist organization - a fact applauded by pro-Israeli media monitors.15 Unfortunately, that is all the background information that most supplied. The Israeli terror that calls forth the Hamas terror was all but left out of the coverage. The party's pre- and post-election effort to moderate its position on negotiations with Israel was, with rare exceptions, largely ignored. And the contradiction inherent in the U.S. government's presentation of itself as a champion of democracy in the Middle East, while utterly refusing to recognize the Hamas victory in a fair election with a 73 percent turnout, was mostly missing. Likewise, coverage of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon gave readers what one media monitor called "the hole story."16 Using allegations that are yet to be proven, the American press transformed Syria from a state that had maintained stability in Lebanon for 16 years following a prolonged and bloody civil war (a fact rarely mentioned in the press) into an occupying power brutally trespassing on Lebanon's sovereignty. Finally, American reporting on the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions also fails to place the controversy in a balanced context. Largely missing from the reporting and analysis, even that which seeks to downplay the alleged Iranian threat, is the fact that Iran might have good reason to feel the need to bolster its defense. The country was invaded by Iraq in the recent past and has been labeled as part of the "Axis of Evil" by President Bush. The Iranians have no doubt noticed (even if the U.S. press has not) that of the three nations so labeled, the only one not invaded or under threat of attack by the United States is the one with the nuclear arsenal (North Korea). This important part of the context lias not been given play in the United States. By presenting such skewed and incomplete pictures, the mainstream media create a public mindset that some scholars have called "low-information rationality,"17 while others wonder at just what point "low-information rationality becomes noinformation irrationality."18 However you want to characterize it, it is a condition wherein most of the American public cannot understand the real import of the behavior either of alleged adversaries or of their own government. This is, of course, an ideal environment for those lobby groups that wish to have their parochial interests thought of as national interests. It allows the lobbies, in the name of national interest, to encourage the media to demonize those who may stand in the way of their economic or ideological ambitions, or those states (such as Syria and Iran) that are the enemies of their friends (such as Israel). But what happens when there are unexpected results - when millions of foreigners across the globe start criticizing American behavior, when most Arabs scorn the notion that the United States is an "honest broker" promoting a "peace process" between Israelis and Palestinians, when Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez condemn Yankee imperialism to the delight of multitudes? Finally, what happens when someone flies a jetliner into the World Trade Center? When such events take place, Americans - with their **half-baked, slanted news** - have no hope of placing these events within an **accurate historical context.** The resulting bewilderment and resentment, further fed by yet **more manipulated information,** is then a major cost of an otherwise natural indifference to things that lie beyond the next hill.

**J) The world is unpredictable—this means we should default to what is most ethical**

**WARD 1996** (Brian, “The Chaos of History: Notes Towards a Postmodernist Historiography,” Limina, Vol 2, http://www.limina.arts.uwa.edu.au/previous/volumes\_15/volume\_2?f=73934)

Porush establishes the link between narrative-as-history and chaos theory by recognising that before chaos theory, a view of human experience based on the metaphor of the Butterfly Effect was ‘dismissed as pertinent only to the realm of accident, coincidence, kismet, and messy human affairs’.35 Now however, chaos theory suggests that unpredictable or nonlinear events are not only the product of human experience but are also a part of ‘reality’. Stephen H. Kellert contends that historical events can be seen to unfold as the Butterfly Effect suggests because history teems ‘with examples of small events that led to momentous and long-lasting changes in the course of human affairs.’36 Porush and Kellert share this belief with physicists like Marcelo Alonso and Gottfried Mayer-Kress. Alonso states that because ‘social systems are not linear, certain local fluctuations (inventions, discoveries**,** revolutions, wars, [and the] emergence of political leaders etc.) may result in major changes’.37 Mayer-Kress also uses the Butterfly Effect as a historical metaphor to argue that nation states can be described as chaotic systems, and that in such systems small events such as terrorist bombings or minor military deployments can act as catalysts, resulting in all-out nuclear war.38 Chaos theory thus appears to have direct historiographical implications. One consequence of chaos for historiography is that **a linear model of causality can no longer be used to determine the causes and effects of historical events**. A postmodernist historiography demonstrates the ineffectiveness of linear causality, which cannot take into account the inherent discontinuity and indeterminism of historical events. A new historiography that relies on the techniques of literary criticism to achieve its deconstruction of historical narratives is developing. This postmodernist historiography takes nonlinear causality into account, and acknowledges that a single historical text cannot represent the whole of an event.39 Because of this, any piece of information within the text is considered to be significant, and no detail, however irrelevant or unimportant it appears, can be overlooked. A postmodern historiography accepts that detail within the historical text is crucial and tiny details or fragments of information may have great relevance and importance to the event being studied. William V. Spanos calls these details ‘minute particulars’, and argues that knowing the minute particulars of a historical event can make a difference to the analysis of that event.40 Ankersmit argues that the postmodernist historiographer must be ‘capable of linking a small, insignificant detail in one part of the work he investigates to an apparently unrelated detail in another part of that work’ in order to gain information and meaning out of a historical event recorded in a text or a series of texts.41

**K) Util justifies nuclear conflict and all atrocities**

**Holt ’95** Jim Holt, commentator for the BBC, writes frequently about politics and philosophy, August 5, 1995, New York Times, “Morality, Reduced To Arithmetic,” p. Lexis

Can the deliberate massacre of innocent people ever be condoned? The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and 9, 1945, resulted in the deaths of 120,000 to 250,000 Japanese by incineration and radiation poisoning. Although a small fraction of the victims were soldiers, the great majority were noncombatants -- women, children, the aged. Among the justifications that have been put forward for President Harry Truman’s decision to use the bomb, only one is worth taking seriously -- that it saved lives. The alternative, the reasoning goes, was to launch an invasion. Truman claimed in his memoirs that this would have cost another half a million American lives. Winston Churchill put the figure at a million. Revisionist historians have cast doubt on such numbers. Wartime documents suggest that military planners expected around 50,000 American combat deaths in an invasion. Still, when Japanese casualties, military and civilian, are taken into account, the overall invasion death toll on both sides would surely have ended up surpassing that from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scholars will continue to argue over whether there were other, less catastrophic ways to force Tokyo to surrender. But given the fierce obstinacy of the Japanese militarists, Truman and his advisers had some grounds for believing that nothing short of a full-scale invasion or the annihilation of a big city with an apocalyptic new weapon would have succeeded. Suppose they were right. Would this prospect have justified the intentional mass killing of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In the debate over the question, participants on both sides have been playing the numbers game. Estimate the hypothetical number of lives saved by the bombings, then add up the actual lives lost. If the first number exceeds the second, then Truman did the right thing; if the reverse, it was wrong to have dropped the bombs. That is one approach to the matter -- the utilitarian approach. **According to utilitarianism**, a form of moral reasoning that arose in the 19th century, **the goodness or evil of an action is determined solely by its consequences. If somehow you can save 10 lives by boiling a baby, go ahead and boil that baby.** There is, however, an older ethical tradition, one rooted in Judeo-Christian theology, that takes a quite different view. The gist of it is expressed by St. Paul’s condemnation of those who say, “Let us do evil, that good may come.” Some actions, this tradition holds, can never be justified by their consequences; they are absolutely forbidden. **It is always wrong to boil a baby even if lives are saved thereby**. Applying this absolutist morality to war can be tricky. When enemy soldiers are trying to enslave or kill us, the principle of self-defense permits us to kill them (though not to slaughter them once they are taken prisoner). But what of those who back them? During World War II, propagandists made much of the “indivisibility” of modern warfare: the idea was that since the enemy nation’s entire economic and social strength was deployed behind its military forces, the whole population was a legitimate target for obliteration. “There are no civilians in Japan,” declared an intelligence officer of the Fifth Air Force shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, a time when the Japanese were popularly depicted as vermin worthy of extermination. The boundary between combatant and noncombatant can be fuzzy, but the distinction is not meaningless, as the case of small children makes clear. Yet is wartime killing of those who are not trying to harm us always tantamount to murder? When naval dockyards, munitions factories and supply lines are bombed, civilian carnage is inevitable. The absolutist moral tradition acknowledges this by a principle known as double effect: although it is always wrong to kill innocents deliberately, it is sometimes permissible to attack a military target knowing some noncombatants will die as a side effect. The doctrine of double effect might even justify bombing a hospital where Hitler is lying ill. It does not, however, apply to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Transformed into hostages by the technology of aerial bombardment, the people of those cities were intentionally executed en masse to send a message of terror to the rulers of Japan. The practice of ordering the massacre of civilians to bring the enemy to heel scarcely began with Truman. Nor did the bomb result in casualties of a new order of magnitude. The earlier bombing of Tokyo by incendiary weapons killed some 100,000 people. **What Hiroshima and Nagasaki did mark, by the unprecedented need for rationalization they presented, was the triumph of utilitarian thinking in the conduct of war.** The conventional code of noncombatant immunity -- a product of several centuries of ethical progress among nations, which had been formalized by an international commission in the 1920’s in the Hague -- was swept away. A simpler axiom took its place: since war is hell, any means necessary may be used to end, in Churchill’s words, “the vast indefinite butchery.” It is a moral calculus that, for all its logical consistency, offends our deep-seated intuitions about the sanctity of life -- our conviction that a person is always to be treated as an end, never as a means. Left up to the warmakers, moreover, **utilitarian calculations are susceptible to bad-faith reasoning: tinker with the numbers enough and virtually any atrocity can be excused in the national interest**. In January, the world commemorated the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, where mass slaughter was committed as an end in itself -- the ultimate evil. The moral nature of Hiroshima is ambiguous by contrast. Yet in the postwar era, when governments do not hesitate to treat the massacre of civilians as just another strategic option, the bomb’s sinister legacy is plain: it has inured us to the idea of reducing innocents to instruments and morality to arithmetic.